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The Implementation Duality
1

Introduction

In this paper we present and pursue a nonlinear-pricing approach to adverse-selection
principal-agent problems and two-sided matching problems. The key observation
underlying our approach is that there is a natural duality between the utilities
different types of agents obtain and the prices attached to different decisions. This
is most easily seen in the matching context. Here, utilities received by agents on
one side on the market serve a dual role as prices, constraining the options available
to agents on the other side of the market. Considering the value functions of the
resulting constrained optimization problems defines a pair of functions, mapping
utility profiles for agents on one side of the market into utility profiles for agents on
the other side of the market. We refer to these functions as implementation maps.
The mathematics carry over without any changes to the principal-agent context,
where agents are matched with decisions rather than with other agents.
Throughout this paper we work without requiring quasilinear utility functions.
In the terminology of matching models we thus allow for imperfectly transferable
utility. In such a setting the implementation maps are dualities in the sense of
abstract convex analysis (Singer, 1997) or, equivalently, form a Galois connection
(Ore, 1944; Birkhoff, 1995). We show that under familiar compactness and continuity
assumptions this “implementation duality” has convenient topological properties.
Together with the order structure inherent in a Galois connection, these topological
properties provide the fuel for our analysis.
Section 2 presents our formal framework and provides the interpretation of our abstract implementation problem both in terms of the adverse-selection principal-agent
model and the two-sided matching model. Section 3 introduces the implementation
maps and studies the duality associated with these maps, culminating in a general
characterization of implementability. In the context of the principal-agent model
this characterization strengthens the taxation principle by identifying the set of
“implementable tariffs” as a minimal set of nonlinear tariffs required to implement any
incentive compatible direct mechanism. Because of the underlying duality structure,
the set of implementable utility profiles and implementable tariffs have identical
structural properties. We show that both of these sets are closed and that bounded
sets of implementable tariffs and utility profiles are uniformly equicontinuous. These
results provide the foundations for the approach considered in this paper, and we
expect them to find additional uses.
Sections 4–6 develop applications of the results in Section 3, explaining how
they fit into the literature as we proceed. Section 4 formulates the principal’s
optimization problem in the principal-agent model as a nonlinear pricing problem.
Due to the possibility of restricting attention to implementable tariffs, the existence

1

of a solution follows from a fairly straightforward application of Weierstrass’ extreme
value theorem. We also show that in the absence of quasilinearity, the optimal
tariff may leave slack in all of the agent’s participation constraints, and we identify
sufficient conditions (implied by the single-crossing condition of Section 5) for a
participation constraint to bind.
Section 5 considers the most commonly studied special case of the principal-agent
model in which types and decisions are one-dimensional and the agent’s utility
function satisfies a single crossing condition. We show that under these conditions
every increasing decision function is implementable for any initial condition. Further,
if the single crossing condition holds strictly, a decision function is implementable if
and only if it is increasing. For the case in which the agent’s utility is quasilinear,
these results are well-known. Our contribution lies in showing that even in the
absence of quasilinearity these results are a direct (albeit nontrivial) consequence
of the underlying duality structure. In particular, as in the quasilinear case, no
smoothness assumptions on utility functions or decision functions are required.
In the context of a two-sided matching model, the single crossing condition we
impose in Section 5 is equivalent to the condition of generalized increasing differences
introduced in Legros and Newman (2007a). Section 6 studies a matching model
satisfying this condition and shows that the existence of a stable positive assortative
matching follows almost immediately from applying our previous results to the dual
relationship between the set of implementable utility profiles for the agents on the
different sides of the market.
There is a long tradition, going back at least to Rochet (1987), of using duality
results from convex analysis (Rockafellar, 1970) and generalized convex analysis
in the investigation of principal-agent models and, more generally, in mechanism
design.1 Ekeland (2010a) provides a survey of results from generalized convex analysis
that are related to the ones we obtain in Section 3 in the context of a principal
agent-model, emphasizing the connection to the theory of optimal transportation
(Villani, 2009). Bardsley (2012) offers a different perspective and provides additional
references. Vohra (2011) discusses the application of convex analysis to mechanism
design; recent notable contributions to this literature include Heydenreich, Müller,
Uetz, and Vohra (2009) and Goeree and Kushnir (2013). That there is a common
duality structure underlying adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided
matching models has been noted most prominently in the literature applying optimal
transportation theory to matching problem (cf. Ekeland, 2010b; Chiappori, McCann,
and Nesheim, 2010).
Quasilinearity is indispensable for the applicability of the tools from generalized
convex analysis and optimal transportation theory. It is thus no coincidence that all
of the literature referenced in the preceding paragraph considers the case in which
1

The cyclical monotonicity condition for incentive compatibility from Rochet (1987) has been
refined and extended in many directions. See Carbajal and Ely (2013) for a useful discussion of this
literature.
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utility functions are quasilinear. While the assumption of quasilinear (or perfectly
transferable) utility is standard in the literature on adverse-selection principal-agent
models and two-sided matching models, it excludes the possibility of taking income
effects into account and, as argued in Legros and Newman (2007a), also precludes
matching models in which utility possibility sets are shaped by underlying incentive
and enforcement constraints. It is thus important to understand how duality results
may be brought to bear in the absence of quasilinearity. In this paper we identify the
relevant duality and show how the properties of this duality can be used to extend
some important results from the quasilinear to the general case. Of course, working
under more general assumptions also has a cost. For instance, in the absence of
quasilinearity there is no hope for revenue equivalence results.
As we have noted before, the duality notion from abstract convex analysis that
we employ is equivalent to a Galois connection. Singer (1997) is a basic reference for
abstract convex analysis, while Erné, Koslowski, Melton, and Strecker (1993) provide
a guide to Galois connections. With the exception of Monjardet (1978, 2007) we have
not encountered papers studying Galois connections in an economic context. We
believe that one reason for this relative neglect of Galois connections in economics is
that obtaining substantial implications requires the presence of additional structure,
like the compactness and continuity properties that we impose.

2

Model

2.1

Basic Ingredients

The basic ingredients of our model are two sets, X and Y , and a function φ :
X × Y × R → R, where R denotes the extended real numbers. We offer two
interpretations of these basic ingredients.2
In the first interpretation X is a set of possible types for an agent, Y is a set
of possible decisions to be taken by the agent, and u = φ(x, y, v) is the utility of
an agent of type x, who takes decision y and provides monetary transfer v to a
principal. To complete the specification of an adverse-selection principal-agent model,
it remains to specify a utility function for the principal, her beliefs over the agent’s
types, and reservation utilities for the agent’s types. We do so in Section 4.
In the second interpretation X is a set of buyer types, Y is a set of seller types,
and φ is the utility frontier describing the feasible payoffs that can be realized in a
match between buyer type x and seller type y. That is, u = φ(x, y, v) is the maximal
utility buyer type x can obtain when matched with seller type y and providing utility
2

Using the extended real numbers in the definition of the function φ simplifies the statements
of preliminary results in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 and clarifies the relationship of our constructions to
the duality literature, but none of our subsequent analysis hinges on this modelling choice. When
offering intuitive interpretations, as in the following two paragraphs, we thus write as if R in the
definition of φ were replaced by R.
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v to the seller. Specifying measures on X and Y and reservation utilities for the
buyer and seller types, as we do in Section 6, provides the missing ingredients to
obtain a two-sided matching model.
We maintain the following assumption throughout:
Assumption 1. The sets X and Y are compact subsets of metric spaces. The
function φ is continuous, strictly decreasing in its third argument, and satisfies
φ(x, y, R) = R for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y .
The assumption that the type space X is compact is standard in principal-agent
models, but violated in some applications in finance (such as Glosten, 1989) in
which unbounded type spaces are considered. As the latter models are known to
behave quite differently (cf. Hellwig, 1992; Mailath and Nöldeke, 2008), we save them
for separate consideration. In a matching model, compactness of Y is simply the
mirror image of the compactness assumption on X. In the principal-agent model
compactness of Y obtains naturally in many situations (e. g. when Y is the set of
probability distributions over a finite number of alternatives), but is also applicable
in principal-agent problems in which the set of possible decisions is more naturally
taken to be unbounded (e. g. the set of possible quantities produced by a monopoly),
but conditions on the primitives of the model (e. g. on marginal costs and willingness
to pay for the monopolist’s product) allow attention to be restricted to a compact
subset, which we identify with Y . We view the continuity assumption on φ as being
uncontroversial, whereas the strict monotonicity of φ in its third argument is in line
with the interpretation of the third argument as a monetary transfer in the principalagent model. In the matching model, the strict monotonicity requirement excludes
the nontransferable utility case, while allowing for either perfectly or imperfectly
transferable utility. Remark 5 in Section 4.3 explains the role and importance of the
full range assumption. Section 3.3 places Assumption 1 in the context of the duality
literature.
We find it convenient to use a neutral term for φ and refer to it (for reasons
explained in Section 3.2) as the generating function. The conditions on the generating
function in Assumption 1 are satisfied if there exists a continuous function f : X×Y →
R such that φ(x, y, v) = f (x, y) − v. We refer to this as the quasilinear case as it
corresponds to assuming that the agent’s utility function in a principal-agent model
is quasilinear in the transfer. In a matching model, the quasilinear case corresponds
to assuming that utility is perfectly transferable between any pair of matched agents.

2.2

The Inverse Generating Function

The inverse generating function ψ : Y × X × R → R is specified as the solution to
the equation
u = φ(x, y, ψ(y, x, u)).
(1)

4

Assumption 1 ensures that for all x ∈ X, y ∈ Y and u ∈ R, there is a unique value
v ∈ R satisfying u = φ(x, y, v), so that the function ψ introduced in (1) is indeed
well-defined and satisfies the “reverse” inverse relationship
v = ψ(y, x, φ(x, y, v)).

(2)

Furthermore, the inverse generating function inherits the properties of the generating
function stated in Assumptions 1. The proof in Appendix A.1 shows that the
following is a direct consequence of (1):
Lemma 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then ψ is continuous, strictly decreasing in its
third argument, and satisfies ψ(y, x, R) = R for all (y, x) ∈ Y × X.
In the context of a matching model the interpretation of ψ is analogous to the one
given for φ: v = ψ(y, x, u) is the maximal utility a seller type y can obtain when
matched with a buyer type x and providing utility u to the buyer. Observe that in
the definition of ψ the order of the first two arguments has been exchanged, so that
in a matching model for both φ and ψ the first argument gives the type of the agent
whose maximal utility is specified and the second argument gives the type of his or
her partner. In particular, in the quasilinear case we have ψ(y, x, u) = g(y, x) − u,
where g(y, x) = f (x, y) holds for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y .
In the context of a principal-agent model the function ψ identifies the largest
transfer an agent of type x can pay for the decision y while obtaining utility level
u.3 In either context, as indicated by (1)–(2) and Lemma 1, the inverse generating
function contains the same information about preferences as the generating function
and has identical properties.

2.3

Profiles and Assignments
X

Y

Let R denote the set of functions from X to R and let R be the set of functions
from Y to R. With the pointwise partial order inherited from the standard order
X
Y
≥ on R the sets R and R are complete lattices. For simplicity we denote both
X
Y
of these partial orders by ≥. For u1 , u2 ∈ R and v1 , v2 ∈ R we use the standard
notation u1 ∨ u2 and u1 ∧ u2 , respectively v1 ∨ v2 and v1 ∧ v2 , to denote the joins
(obtained by taking pointwise maxima) and meets (obtained by taking pointwise
minima).
X
Y
Throughout the following we refer to u ∈ R and v ∈ R as profiles. In the
context of a matching model we interpret u as a utility profile for buyers, whereas v
3

Mirrlees (1986, p. 1231) introduces a counterpart to the inverse generating function in his analysis
of the optimal income taxation problem; Hellwig (2010, Proposition 2.6) features an application in
the context of a principal-agent model. Luenberger (1992) refers to an analogous (but more general)
measure of the agent’s willingness-to-pay as the benefit function and establishes duality results
linking the benefit function to the expenditure function.
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is a utility profile for sellers. In the context of a principal-agent model u is again
a utility profile, corresponding to the specification of a rent function for the agent
types, whereas we interpret v as a non-linear tariff offered by the principal to the
agent, with v(y) specifying the transfer to the principal at which any type of agent
can purchase decision y.
Allowing for profiles mapping into the extended real numbers is convenient for
X
Y
parts of our analysis because R and R are complete lattices. Our main interest,
however, is in real-valued profiles that are bounded in the sets RX and RY . We
let B(X) ⊂ RX and B(Y ) ⊂ RY denote the corresponding sets of profiles and
for simplicity refer to the elements of these sets as bounded profiles. We endow
B(X) and B(Y ) with the supremum norm, denoted by k · k in both cases, making
them complete metric spaces for the induced metric. The sets B(X) and B(Y ) are
X
Y
conditionally complete sublattices of R resp. R .4 We let CB(X) ⊂ B(X) and
CB(Y ) ⊂ B(Y ) denote the sets of continuous and bounded profiles.
Let Y X denote the set of functions from X to Y and let X Y be the set of functions
from Y to X. Any function y ∈ Y X and any function x ∈ X Y will be referred to
as an assignment. In the matching context, the interpretation of an assignment
y ∈ Y X is that y = y(x) is the type of seller with whom buyer x matches; the
interpretation of an assignment x ∈ X Y is analogous.5 In the principal-agent model,
an assignment y ∈ Y X specifies a decision for every agent type, whereas we can
think of an assignment x ∈ X Y as specifying for every decision y the agent type
x = x(y) to whom the principal assigns this decision. In this context we thus follow
Nöldeke and Samuelson (2007) in referring to y as a decision assignment and to x
as a type assignment.

2.4

Implementable Pairs, Profiles, and Assignments
X

Y

For given u ∈ R , respectively for given v ∈ R , define the correspondences
Xu : Y ⇒ X and Yv : X ⇒ Y by
Xu (y) = argmax ψ(y, x, u(x))

(3)

x∈X

Yv (x) = argmax φ(x, y, v(y)).

(4)

y∈Y
4

That is, all nonempty, order bounded subsets of profiles in B(X) and B(Y ) have suprema and
infima in these sets (cf. Birkhoff, 1995, Chapter V.3).
5
Note that the definition of an assignment does not incorporate any notion of feasibility (e.g., an
assignment x could specify that all types of the seller match with the same type of buyer). In the
matching context an assignment is thus sometime referred to as a semi-matching. An appropriate
feasibility notion for the matching model will be introduced in Section 6.
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We say that a profile v ∈ R

Y

implements the pair (u, y) ∈ RX × Y X if
y(x) ∈ Yv (x)

(5)

u(x) = max φ(x, y, v(y))

(6)

y∈Y

holds for all x ∈ X (which, obviously, implies that Yv (x) is non-empty valued).
X
Similarly, a profile u ∈ R implements the pair (v, x) ∈ RX × X Y if
x(y) ∈ Xu (y)

(7)

v(y) = max ψ(y, x, u(x))

(8)

x∈X

holds for all y ∈ Y . We also say that a profile v implements the profile u (assignment
y) if there exists y (there exists u) such that v implements (u, y) and use the
analogous terminology for profiles u and assignments x.
Note that our definitions require that implementable profiles be real-valued,
whereas a profile implementing a pair may take on values in the extended real
numbers. Remark 1 at the end of this section explains the reasons for these choices.
Later on we show that it is without loss of generality to require both implementing
and implemented profiles profiles to be not only real-valued, but also bounded (see
Lemma 2).
The interpretation of the above implementation conditions in a matching model
is clear: When v implements the pair (u, y) every buyer type x finds it optimal to
select seller type y(x) as a partner and by doing so obtains the utility u(x), given
that sellers have to be provided with the utility profile v. Similarly, u implements
the pair (v, x) if every seller type y finds it optimal to select buyer type x(y) as a
partner and obtains utility v(y) from doing so when faced with the utility profile u.
The interpretation of the statement that v implements (u, y) in a principal-agent
model is familiar: when faced with the tariff v, an agent of type x finds it optimal
to choose decision y(x) and obtains utility u(x) from doing so. The interpretation
of the statement that u implements (v, x) is less standard. It means the following:
For every decision y ∈ Y , type x(y) is (one of) the type(s) who can pay the most for
the decision y (while receiving utility at least u(x)) and v(y) is the corresponding
maximized willingness-to-pay for the decision y. Assuming that the principal’s utility
is strictly increasing in the transfer and (for the sake of illustration) does not depend
on the type of agent with whom she interacts, x(y) thus identifies (one of) the most
profitable type(s) of the agent to whom the principal would want to sell decision y
and v(y) is the resulting revenue, given that type x of the agent has to be provided
with utility level u(x).
Pairs, profiles, and assignments are said to be implementable if there exists a
profile implementing them.

7

Remark 1 (Implementability and Direct Mechanisms). As noted above, our definitions require that implementable profiles be real-valued, whereas a profile implementing a pair may take on values in the extended real numbers. Together these
features ensure that in the principal-agent model a pair (u, y) is implementable in
the sense defined above if and only if there exists an incentive compatible direct
mechanism (t, y) ∈ RX × Y X , satisfying u(x) = φ(x, y(x), t(x)) for all x ∈ X. The
only-if direction of this claim is immediate from the revelation principle, while the if
direction follows because standard proofs of the taxation principle (e.g. Guesnerie
and Laffont, 1994; Rochet, 1985) are applicable to our setting. In particular, these
standard proofs apply when infinite transfers are allowed, motivating us to allow
profiles that map into the extended reals.

3

Duality

In this section we provide a general characterization of implementable pairs and
profiles. Section 3.1 introduces a pair of functions between the sets of profiles that we
refer to as implementation maps. These implementation maps are the key building
block in all of our subsequent analysis. The implementation maps are dualities (in
X
Y
the sense of Singer, 1997) between the sets of profiles R and R . Equivalently, the
implementation maps give rise to a Galois connection between these sets. Section 3.2
makes these statements precise and provides some further discussion and properties
of Galois connections.
Linking the duality structure of the implementation maps to properties of implementable pairs and profiles requires more than the order structure captured by
the observation that these maps are a Galois connection. Section 3.3 provides such
a link. Here we exploit Assumption 1 to show that there is no loss of generality in
restricting the domain of the implementation maps to the set of bounded profiles and
that, once this is done, the sets of implementable profiles coincide with the ranges of
the implementation maps. Building on these observations, Section 3.4 provides a
characterization of implementable profiles and implementable pairs. Proposition 3
shows that every implementable pair can be implemented by an implementable profile.
As an immediate consequence, we obtain a strengthening of the taxation principle,
asserting that every incentive compatible direct mechanism in the principal-agent
model can be obtained as the outcome of facing the agent with an implementable
tariff (Corollary 3). Section 3.5 illustrates Proposition 3 by relating it to the duality
results we have obtained for a quasilinear principal-agent model in Nöldeke and
Samuelson (2007). Section 3.6 notes some implications of our characterization results
for the topological structure of the set of implementable profiles, culminating in the
uniform equicontinuity result (Corollary 5) that we have already noted in Section 1.
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3.1

Implementation Maps
Y

X

We define the implementation maps Φ : R → R

X

and Ψ : R

Φv(x) = sup φ(x, y, v(y)) ∀x ∈ X

→R

Y

by setting
(9)

y∈Y

Ψu(y) = sup ψ(y, x, u(x)) ∀y ∈ Y.

(10)

x∈X
Y

Observe that v ∈ R implements u ∈ RX if and only if u = Φv holds and, in
addition, the suprema in (9) are finite and attained for all x ∈ X, that is, Yv is
X
non-empty valued. Similarly, u ∈ R implements v ∈ RY if and only if v = Ψu holds
and, in addition, the suprema in (10) are finite and attained for all y ∈ Y , that is, Xu
is non-empty valued. Consequently, it is clear that the sets of implementable profiles,
which we denote by I(X) ⊂ RX and I(Y ) ⊂ RY in the following, are contained in
the images of the implementation maps.

3.2

The Galois Connection

The implementation map Φ is a duality in the sense of Singer (1997) with Ψ corresponding to the dual of Φ.6 Penot (2000, 2010) refers to the function φ as the
generating function for the duality Ψ, explaining our use of the term. Every duality
between complete lattices gives rise to a Galois connection (Birkhoff, 1995, p. 124)
between these lattices (and vice versa, cf. Singer, 1997, Theorem 5.4, p. 179).7 As
the proof is straightforward for generating functions satisfying Assumption 1, we
include it here.
Proposition 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. The implementation maps Φ and Ψ are a
Galois connection. That is,
u ≥ Φv ⇐⇒ v ≥ Ψu
X

holds for all u ∈ R

(11)

Y

and v ∈ R .

6
Singer (1997, Definition 5.1, p. 172) defines a duality as a map between complete lattices which
is order reversing in the sense that for any set (including the empty set), the image of the infimum
of that set is the supremum of its image. For the case in which the complete lattices are given by
X
Y
R and R it follows from the characterization result in Singer (1997, Theorem 7.4, p. 230) that
the implementation map Φ is a duality.
7
Observe that there is an alternative definition of a Galois connection in which the second
inequality in (11) below is reversed (Davey and Priestley, 2002, Chapter 7) and that in the original
definition of a Galois connection (Ore, 1944) both inequalities in (12) are reversed. None of these
differences are essential, as equivalence between the various definitions can be restored by replacing
Y
X
either R or R or both by their order dual(s). The kind of Galois connection we consider is
sometimes referred to as an antitone Galois connection.
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Proof.

To obtain (11) observe:
u ≥ Φv ⇐⇒ u(x) ≥ sup φ(x, y, v(y)) for all x ∈ X
y∈Y

⇐⇒ u(x) ≥ φ(x, y, v(y)) for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y
⇐⇒ ψ(y, x, u(x)) ≤ v(y) for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y
⇐⇒ v(y) ≥ sup ψ(y, x, u(x)) for all y ∈ Y
x∈X

⇐⇒ v ≥ Ψu,
where the first equivalence holds by the definition of Φv in (9), the second is from
the definition of the supremum, the third uses (2) and that the inverse generating
function ψ is strictly decreasing in its third argument (Lemma 1), the fourth is by
the definition of the supremum, and the fifth holds by definition of Ψu in (10).
To interpret Proposition 1 consider the matching model. Suppose we have a pair
of profiles u and v such that each buyer x ∈ X is content to obtain u(x) rather
than matching with any seller y ∈ Y and providing that seller with utility v(y), that
is, the inequality u ≥ Φv holds. It is then intuitive that every seller y ∈ Y would
similarly weakly prefer to obtain utility v(y) to matching with any buyer x ∈ X who
insists on receiving utility u(x), that is, the inequality v ≥ Ψu holds. Reversing the
roles of buyers and sellers in this argument suggests the equivalence in (11).
The following corollary notes some standard implications of the fact that Φ and Ψ
are a Galois connection. Our terms for these implications follow Davey and Priestley
(2002, p. 159).8 Again, we include the straightforward proof.
Corollary 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. The implementation maps Φ and Ψ
X
Y
[1.1] satisfy the cancellation rule, that is, for all u ∈ R and v ∈ R :
v ≥ ΨΦv and u ≥ ΦΨu;
[1.2] are order reversing, that is, for all u1 , u2 ∈ R

(12)
X

Y

and v1 , v2 ∈ R :

v1 ≥ v2 ⇒ Φv2 ≥ Φv1 and u1 ≥ u2 ⇒ Ψu2 ≥ Ψu1 ;
[1.3] and satisfy the semi-inverse rule, that is, for all u ∈ R
ΦΨΦv = Φv and ΨΦΨu = Ψu.

X

(13)
Y

and v ∈ R :
(14)

8
As noted in Birkhoff (1995, Section 5.8), the properties stated in Corollary 1.1–1.2 below are in
fact equivalent to (11) and are sometimes taken to be the definition of a Galois connection (e.g.,
Singer, 1997, Definition 5.3 and Remark 5.6).
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Proof. We use (11) to establish (12)–(14). In each case we prove the first of the two
Y
statements; the second statement follows by a dual argument. First, for any v ∈ R
we trivially have Φv ≥ Φv, so that setting u = Φv in (11) yields (12). Second, let
v1 ≥ v2 . By (12) we have v2 ≥ ΨΦv2 and thus v1 ≥ ΨΦv2 . Applying (11) with
v = v1 and u = Φv2 then gives the consequent of (13). Third, (12) gives v ≥ ΨΦv.
Applying (13) with v1 = v and v2 = ΨΦv to this inequality yields ΦΨΦv ≥ Φv. To
Y
establish (14) it remains to establish the reverse inequality. For every v ∈ R we
have ΨΦv ≥ ΨΦv, so that using ΨΦv in place of v and Φv in place of u in (11)
yields Φv ≥ ΦΨΦv.
Among the properties of the implementation maps noted in Corollary 1, the orderreversal property (Corollary 1.2) is the one with the most obvious economic interpretation: in a matching model all agents prefer to choose from a given set of potential
partners when the partners have low rather than high reservation utilities. To provide
perspective on the other two properties, let us consider the quasilinear case.
In the quasilinear case the definitions of the implementation maps in (9) and (10)
reduce to
Φv(x) = sup [f (x, y) − v(y))]
y∈Y

Ψu(y) = sup [g(y, x) − u(x)] ,
x∈X

indicating that in this case Φv is nothing but the f -conjugate of v and Ψu is the
g-conjugate of u (cf. Ekeland, 2010a, Section 3.2). The properties noted in Corollary
1 may then be viewed as generalizing corresponding properties from the theory of
conjugate duality. Indeed, the cancellation property (Corollary 1.1) corresponds
to the statement that the biconjugate of any function is smaller than the function
itself and the semi-inverse rule (Corollary 1.3) corresponds to the statement that
a conjugate function is its own biconjugate. These are well-known implications of
conjugate duality (cf. Ekeland, 2010a, Section 3.4).
The properties of Galois connections stated in Corollary 1 are the ones which
are of direct relevance for our subsequent analysis. Galois connections have many
other interesting structural properties which are likely to be of relevance in the
study of implementation problems. The following remark notes one of these which,
again, might be viewed as a generalization of a well-known result from the theory of
conjugate duality.
X

Y

Remark 2 (Fenchel Inequalities). Consider profiles u ∈ R and v ∈ R satisfying
the equality u = Φv. The proof of Proposition 1 shows that we then have
v(y) ≥ ψ(y, x, u(x)) = ψ(y, x, Φv(x))

(15)

for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y . Dually, the equality v = Ψu implies
u(x) ≥ φ(x, y, v(y)) = φ(x, y, Ψu(y))
11

(16)

for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y . In the terminology of Singer (1997, Definition 7.2, p. 236)
these are the generalized Fenchel-Young inequalities. Dropping the middle term in
each of (15) and (16), we can rewrite the remaining inequalities in the quasilinear
case as
v(y) + Φv(x) ≥ f (x, y)
u(x) + Ψu(y) ≥ g(y, x),
for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y . These are familiar Fenchel inequalities for conjugate functions
(see, for instance, Ekeland, 2010a, Proposition 7), which play an important role
in convex analysis because the graphs of the argmax-correspondences Xu and Yv
coincide with the subsets of X × Y for which the corresponding Fenchel inequality
holds with equality. This observation carries over to the generalized Fenchel-Young
inequalities given above.

3.3

Linking Implementable Profiles and the Implementation Maps

Singer (1997, Theorem 7.4, p. 230) shows that Proposition 1 and, thus, Corollary 1
hold under assumptions on the generating function weaker than the ones we have
imposed in Assumption 1. In particular, the sets X and Y may be arbitrary, the only
continuity property required is lower semicontinuity of the generating function in
its third argument, and weak rather than strict monotonicity in the third argument
suffices. The role of Assumption 1 in our analysis thus is not to ensure that the
implementation maps are a Galois connection. Rather, it ensures that we have a
particularly conveniently-behaved duality.
We begin by noting that due to Assumption 1 every implementable pair features
a bounded profile and can in turn be implemented by a bounded profile. Intuitively,
one cannot implement a profile u of buyer utilities in which two buyers receive
utilities that are arbitrarily far apart because the low-utility buyer would then prefer
the seller chosen by the high-utility buyer. Appendix A.2 proves:
Lemma 2. Let Assumption 1 hold. If (u, y) ∈ RX × Y X is implementable, then
u ∈ B(X) holds and there exists v ∈ B(Y ) implementing (u, y). Dually, if (v, x) ∈
RY × X Y is implementable, then v ∈ B(Y ) holds and there exists u ∈ B(X)
implementing (v, x).
For the purpose of characterizing implementable profiles and pairs we may thus
restrict attention to bounded profiles both in the domain and in the range of the
implementation maps. From hereon we accordingly take the domains and ranges of
the implementation maps Φ and Ψ to be the sets of bounded profiles. With a slight
abuse of notation, we continue to denote these maps by Φ and Ψ. Similarly, we will
hereafter view sets of profiles as subsets of the metric spaces B(X) and B(Y ), so
that (for example) we will establish closure properties relative to these sets.
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Our next result, proven in Appendix A.3, provides a simple sufficient condition
under which a bounded profile implements its image under the relevant implementation map, that is, the suprema in the definitions of the implementation maps are finite
and attained. Intuitively, the lower semicontinuity of v ensures that φ(x, y, v(y))
is an upper semicontinuous function of y for each x, at which point Weierstrass’
extreme value theorem ensures that it has a maximizer.
Lemma 3. Let Assumption 1 hold. If a profile v ∈ B(Y ) is lower semicontinuous,
then it implements Φv. Dually, if a profile u ∈ B(X) is lower semicontinuous, then
it implements Ψu.
Bounded profiles that are not lower semicontinuous may fail to implement their
image under the relevant implementation map. However, replacing a profile by
its lower semicontinuous hull (which is bounded) leaves the image of the profile
unchanged and, by Lemma 3, provides a profile implementing the given image.9 In
conjunction with Lemma 2 this argument yields the first part of the following lemma.
Having established that every implementable profile can be implemented by a profile
which is both bounded and lower semicontinuous, the second part of the lemma is a
consequence of Berge’s maximum theorem. The proof for both parts is in Appendix
A.4.
Lemma 4. Let Assumption 1 hold.
[4.1] A profile is implementable if and only if it is the image of a bounded profile
under the relevant implementation map. That is,
I(X) = ΦB(Y ) and I(Y ) = ΨB(X).

(17)

[4.2] All implementable profiles are continuous. That is,
I(X) ⊂ CB(X) and I(Y ) ⊂ CB(Y ).

3.4

(18)

Characterizing Implementable Profiles and Pairs

Substituting the condition u = Φv into the first statement of the semi-inverse rule
in Corollary 1.3 shows that an implementable profile u ∈ I(X) is not only bounded
(Lemma 2) but also satisfies u = ΦΨu. Vice versa, a profile u ∈ B(X) satisfying
u = ΦΨu is the image of the profile v = Ψu under the implementation map Φ.
Because the profile v is bounded and continuous (Lemma 4) it then implements
u (Lemma 3), showing that u is implementable. Dually, a profile v ∈ B(Y ) is
implementable if and only if it is bounded and satisfies v = ΨΦv. Hence, it is a direct
implication of Corollary 1 and the properties of implementable profiles established in
9

The lower semicontinuous hull of a function is also known as its lsc regularization or its lower
closure (Rockafellar and Wets, 1998, p. 14). Our terminology follows Penot (2013, Proposition 1.21).
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the previous subsection that implementable profiles are those bounded profiles for
which equality holds in the cancellation rule:10
Proposition 2. Let Assumption 1 hold.
[2.1] Profile u ∈ B(X) is implementable if and only if u = ΦΨu.
[2.2] Profile v ∈ B(Y ) is implementable if and only if v = ΨΦv.
We note that for every Galois connection the fixed point condition u = ΦΨu characterizes the image of the map Φ and the fixed point condition v = ΨΦv characterizes the
image of the map Ψ (cf. Singer, 1997, Corollary 5.6). In the absence of Assumption
1 there is no guarantee, however, that profiles satisfying these fixed point conditions,
even when bounded, are implementable, so that Assumption 1 plays an essential role
in going from a characterization of the images of the implementation maps (which
we are not interested in as such) to the characterization of implementable profiles in
Proposition 2.
It is an immediate implication of Proposition 2 that the restrictions of the
implementation maps to the domains I(X) and I(Y ) of implementable profiles are
inverse to each other and thus are bijections:
u = Φv ⇐⇒ v = Ψu,

for all u ∈ I(X) and v ∈ I(Y ).

(19)

Using Lemmas 3 and 4.2, every implementable profile u is thus implemented by the
implementable profile v = Ψu and, dually, every implementable profile v is implemented by the implementable profile u = Φv.11 Figure 1 provides an illustration.
For the purpose of studying implementable profiles, there is thus nothing lost in
eliminating non-implementable profiles from the domain of the implementation maps.
The following characterization result shows that the same applies to implementable
pairs.
Proposition 3. Let Assumption 1 hold.
[3.1] If (u, y) ∈ B(X) × Y X is implementable, then there is a unique implementable profile v implementing it, namely v = Ψu.
[3.2] If (v, x) ∈ B(Y )×X Y is implementable, then there is a unique implementable
profile u implementing it, namely u = Φv.
Proof. We consider the first claim; the proof for the second is analogous. Let
(u, y) ∈ B(X) × Y X be implementable. Let v = Ψu. Then, as we have already
mentioned, v implements u: As the image of a bounded profile under the implementation map Ψ, v is implementable, bounded, and continuous (Lemma 4). From
10
In the quasilinear case this is the statement that a profile is implementable if and only if it is
bounded and is its own generalized biconjugate.
11
In words we might rephrase this observation as “for every implementable profile there is an
implementable profile implementing it, namely the profile implemented by it.” This may seem like a
mouthful, but such is the nature of a Galois connection.
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Φ
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u implements v = Ψu
Φ(R̄Y )

B(X)
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v I(Y )

(bijection)

B(Y )

Ψ(R̄X )

v implements u = Φv
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Ψ(B
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X )Φ(B(Y

)) =

I(Y )

Φ

Ψ

Figure 1: Illustration of the implementation maps. The implementation map Φ maps
Y
X
X
Y
R into R (and Ψ maps from R into R ). When restricted to the set of bounded
profiles B(Y ), Φ maps into the set of implementable profiles (I(X) (and Ψ maps
from the set of bounded profiles B(X) into the set of implementable profiles I(Y )).
The maps Φ and Ψ are (inverse) bijections on the sets of implementable profiles
I(X) and (I(Y ) with profiles u and v in these sets satisfying u = Φv ⇐⇒ v = Ψu
implementing each other.
Lemma 3, v thus implements Φv. From Proposition 2 we have Φv = u, so that v
implements u. Further, from (19) there is no implementable ṽ 6= v implementing u.
It thus remains to show that v also implements y.
As (u, y) is implementable there exists ṽ ∈ B(Y ) implementing it, thus satisfying
u = Φṽ. From the first inequality in the cancellation rule (12) in Corollary 1.1, we
have ṽ ≥ Ψu and, thus, ṽ ≥ v. Now suppose that v does not implement y. Because
v implements u there then exists (x̂, ŷ) ∈ X × Y such that
u(x̂) = φ(x̂, ŷ, v(ŷ)) > φ(x̂, y(x̂), v(y(x̂))) ≥ φ(x̂, y(x̂), ṽ(y(x̂))),
where the last inequality uses ṽ ≥ v and the assumption that φ is decreasing in its
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third argument. But because ṽ implements (u, y) we also have
u(x̂) = φ(x̂, y(x̂)), ṽ(y(x̂))),
resulting in a contradiction which finishes the proof.
It is trivial that (u, y) ∈ B(X) × Y X is implementable if it is implemented by
v = Ψu, so that Proposition 3.1 does indeed provide a complete characterization of
implementable pairs (u, y). Similarly, Proposition 3.2 characterizes implementable
(v, x) ∈ B(Y ) × X Y as those pairs (v, x) which are implemented by u = Φv. We
may thus view Proposition 3 as providing a (conceptually) simple test for deciding
whether a pair is implementable: given any pair, determine the profile implemented
by the profile in that pair. If that profile exists and implements the pair, then the
pair is implementable; otherwise it is not.
As we have already established in Lemma 4.2 that implementable profiles are
continuous, the following is an immediate consequence of Proposition 3.12
Corollary 2. Every implementable pair can be implemented with a bounded and
continuous profile.
In Remark 1 we have noted that if (t, y) ∈ RX × Y X is an incentive compatible
direct mechanism, then the pair (u, y) ∈ RX × Y X is implementable, where u is the
utility profile resulting when all agent types take decision y(x) and pay the transfer
t(x), that is, u(x) = φ(x, y(x), t(x)) holds for all x ∈ X. If the tariff v implements
(u, y), we also have u(x) = φ(x, y(x), v(y(x))), so that t(x) = v(y(x)) holds for all
x ∈ X. In conjunction with Proposition 3 we thus have the following strengthening
of the taxation principle, asserting that every incentive compatible direct mechanism
can be obtained as the the result of facing the agent with an implementable tariff v:
Corollary 3 (A Stronger Taxation Principle). Let Assumption 1 hold. If (t, y) ∈
RX × Y X is an incentive compatible direct mechanism, then there exists a tariff
v ∈ I(Y ) implementing y and satisfying t(x) = v(y(x)) for all x ∈ X.
Remark 3 (Implementable Behavior). If v ∈ I(Y ) implements u ∈ I(X), then it
follows from Proposition 3 and the equivalence in (19) that u also implements v
(and vice versa). This inverse relationship extends to the argmax-correspondences
associated with these two profiles: If u and v implement each other, then the
correspondences Xu and Yv satisfy
x̂ ∈ Xu (ŷ) ⇐⇒ ŷ ∈ Yv (x̂).

(20)

12
Weibull (1989) has obtained related results in an optimal taxation model with one-dimensional
types and decisions.
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To prove (20), we may proceed as follows: As u implements v, we have v(y) =
maxx∈X ψ(y, x, u(x)) for all y ∈ Y , so that the equivalence
x̂ ∈ Xu (ŷ) ⇐⇒ v(ŷ) = ψ(ŷ, x̂, u(x̂))
obtains. Similarly, as v implements u we have u(x) = maxy∈Y φ(x, y, v(y)) for all
x ∈ X and thus the equivalence
ŷ ∈ Yv (x̂) ⇐⇒ u(x̂) = φ(x̂, ŷ, v(ŷ)).
From the inverse relationship between φ and ψ we have
v(ŷ) = ψ(ŷ, x̂, u(x̂)) ⇐⇒ u(x̂) = φ(x̂, ŷ, v(ŷ)).
Combining these three equivalences, we obtain (20).
When u and v implement each other, the correspondences Xu and Yv are both
nonempty-valued. Hence, (20) implies that both of these correspondences are in fact
onto, that is, Xu (Y ) = X and Yv (X) = Y holds.

3.5

Example

To illustrate Proposition 3 we consider the following example, for which Nöldeke and
Samuelson (2007) have obtained related characterization results. Let X = [x, x] and
Y = [y, y] be compact intervals in the real numbers and let the generating function be
given by φ(x, y, v) = f (x, y) − v, where the function f : X × Y is twice continuously
differentiable with partial derivatives fx and fy and strictly positive cross derivative
fxy , that is fxy (x, y) > 0 holds for all (x, y) in the interior of X × Y . In the principalagent interpretation we are thus considering the case in which the utility function of
the agent is quasilinear, satisfies standard differentiability conditions, and is strictly
supermodular.
In this case it is well-known that a pair (u, y) is implementable if and only if y
is increasing (Rochet, 1987) and u satisfies (Milgrom and Segal, 2002, Footnote 10)
Z x1
u(x1 ) − u(x) =
fx (x, y(x))dx, ∀x1 ∈ X.
(21)
x

The set I(X) is then given by the set of profiles u satisfying (21) for some increasing
decision assignment y.
By symmetry, a pair (v, x) is implementable if and only if x is increasing and v
satisfies
Z y1
v(y1 ) − v(y) =
gy (y, x(y))dy, ∀y1 ∈ Y
(22)
y
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and the set I(Y ) is then given by the set of profiles v satisfying (22) for some
increasing type assignment x.13
For this example, Lemma 1 in Nöldeke and Samuelson (2007) establishes that
every implementable (u, y) can be implemented by a tariff v satisfying (22) for some
increasing x and thus, in the terminology we use here, by an implementable tariff.
Proposition 3.1 provides a general version of this result and adds the observation that
the unique implementable tariff implementing (u, y) is given by v = Ψu. Using the
equivalence v = Ψu ⇐⇒ u = Φv in (19) and Lemma 2 in Nöldeke and Samuelson
(2007) we can give an explicit expression for this tariff v. In particular, v is given
by (22), where x is any inverse of y and v(y) is determined by the initial condition
u(x) + v(y) = f (x, y).14 Dually, Proposition 3.2 here is the statement that every
implementable (v, x) is implemented by u satisfying (21) with y being an inverse
of x and u(x) = f (x, y) − v(y). Further, there is no other implementable tariff
implementing (v, x).
Nöldeke and Samuelson (2007) point to one use for these results. The standard
technique of solving for (u, y) by examining a relaxed problem that omits the
monotonicity constraint on y may yield a solution that violates the omitted constraint,
forcing one into an ironing procedure. As we note in Nöldeke and Samuelson (2007),
ironing may be avoided by instead examining (v, x).
13

Because f (x, y) = g(y, x) holds, we can rewrite (22) as
Z y1
v(y1 ) − v(y) =
fy (x(y), y)dy, ∀y1 ∈ Y,
y

which is the counterpart to equation (5) in Nöldeke and Samuelson (2007).
14
Given an increasing assignment y : X → Y let Y : X ⇒ Y denote the maximally monotone
correspondence generated by y, that is (c.f Rockafellar and Wets, 1998, Exercise 12.9.b),


Y (x) = lim y(xn ), lim y(xn )
xn ↑x

xn ↓x

for all x ∈ X and define the correspondence X : Y ⇒ X for increasing x : Y → X in an analogous
manner. We say that increasing assignments x and y are inverse if and only if the associated
correspondences X and Y are inverse, that is, x ∈ X(y) ⇐⇒ y ∈ Y (x) holds. Let v satisfy (22)
for increasing x. Now consider any implementable (u, y), take an inverse x of y, and let v satisfy
(22) with v(y) = f (x, y) − u(x). Lemma 2 in Nöldeke and Samuelson (2007) shows that then Yv
is the inverse of X, so that v implements x and Yv is maximally monotone. Further, because
Yv is maximally monotone, we have y ∈ Yv (x), implying that the profile u0 implemented by y
satisfies (21) with u0 (x) = f (x, y) − v(y) = u(x) and is thus equal to u. More generally, under the
assumptions maintained in this subsection the profiles u and v implement each other if and only if
(i) u(x) + v(y) = f (x, y) or, equivalently, u(x) + v(y) = g(y, x) holds and (ii) conditions (21) and
(22) hold for increasing y and x that are inverse to each other. In this case we have X = Xu and
Y = Yv , so that Xu and Yv are inverse to each other. Remark 3 shows that the latter property
does not require the special structure of the example, but holds in general.
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3.6

Properties of Implementable Profiles

Proposition 3 provides a powerful tool to obtain properties of (the sets of) implementable pairs and profiles. Here we present two corollaries, which illustrate this
for the case of implementable profiles and are used repeatedly in the following.
Subsequent sections return to the consideration of implementable pairs.
Besides Proposition 3 we require two topological properties of the implementation
maps. These are stated in the following lemma. Appendix A.5 proves:15
Lemma 5. Let Assumption 1 hold. The implementation maps Φ : B(Y ) → B(X)
and Ψ : B(X) → B(Y ) are
[5.1] continuous
[5.2] and map bounded sets into bounded sets.
Using Lemma 5.1, we first establish that the sets of implementable profiles are
closed in the set of bounded profiles.
Corollary 4. Let Assumption 1 hold. The sets of implementable profiles I(X) and
I(Y ) are closed subsets of B(X) resp. B(Y ).
Proof. We show that I(X) ⊂ B(X) is closed; the argument for the dual case is
analogous. Consider a sequence {un }∞
n=1 of profiles in I(X) converging to some
u∗ ∈ B(X) (in the sup norm). We want to show that u∗ is implementable. For
all n ∈ N we have vn = Ψun ∈ I(Y ) ⊂ B(Y ), so that {vn }∞
n=1 is a sequence in
B(Y ). By the continuity property of Ψ established in Lemma 5.1, the sequence
∗
∗
{vn }∞
n=1 converges to v = Ψu , which is implementable (Lemma 4.1). Because vn
implements un (Proposition 3) we have un = Φvn for all n. Continuity of Φ then
implies u∗ = Φv ∗ , establishing that u∗ is implementable (Lemma 4.1).
Next, implementable profiles are not only continuous (as we have already established in Lemma 4.2), but bounded sets of implementable profiles are uniformly
equicontinuous. The proof uses Lemma 5.2.
Corollary 5. Let Assumption 1 hold. If U ⊂ I(X) is bounded, then it is uniformly
equicontinuous. Dually, if V ⊂ I(Y ) is bounded, then it is uniformly equicontinuous.
15
It is easy to see that U ⊂ B(X) is order bounded (that is, there exists u ∈ B(X) and u ∈ B(X)
such that u ≤ u ≤ u holds for all u ∈ U) if and only if it is norm bounded in B(X) (that is, there
exists u ∈ R such that kuk ≤ u holds for all u ∈ U ) and that the same observation applies to
V ⊂ B(Y ). Hence, here and throughout the following we simply refer to a set of profiles in B(X) or
B(Y ) as being bounded without distinguishing between boundedness in order and boundedness in
norm.
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Proof. Let V ⊂ I(Y ) be bounded. (The proof for the dual case in which U ⊂ I(X)
is bounded is analogous.) Fix  > 0. To show uniform equicontinuity of V, we have
to establish that there exists δ > 0 such that
kỹ − yk < δ =⇒ kv(ỹ) − v(y)k < 

(23)

holds for all ỹ, y ∈ Y and v ∈ V.
Because V is bounded, so is U = ΦV (Lemma 5.2). We may then choose u < ū ∈ R
such that u ∈ U implies u ≤ u(x) ≤ ū for all x ∈ X. Because ψ is continuous (Lemma
1), it is uniformly continuous on the compact set Y × X × [u, ū]. Consequently, there
exists δ > 0 such that
kỹ − yk < δ =⇒ kψ(ỹ, x, u) − ψ(y, x, u)k < 

(24)

holds for all (x, u) ∈ X × [u, ū]. Fix such a δ and let kỹ − yk < δ hold.
Consider any v ∈ V. From Proposition 3 the profile u = Φv ∈ U implements v.
Let x ∈ Xu (y) and x̃ ∈ Xu (ỹ). We then have
v(y) =ψ(y, x, u(x)) ≥ ψ(y, x̃, u(x̃)),
v(ỹ) =ψ(ỹ, x̃, u(x̃)) ≥ ψ(ỹ, x, u(x)),
implying
 > ψ(ỹ, x̃, u(x̃)) − ψ(y, x̃, u(x̃)) ≥ v(ỹ) − v(y) ≥ ψ(ỹ, x, u(x)) − ψ(y, x, u(x)) > −,
where the outer inequalities are from (24) and the fact that u ≤ u(x) ≤ ū holds for
all x ∈ X. Consequently, we have kv(ỹ) − v(y)k < , thus establishing (23).

4

Optimal Tariffs in the Principal-Agent Model

This section applies our characterizations of implementable profiles and pairs to
establish the existence of optimal tariffs in a broad class of adverse-selection principalagent models. We begin in Section 4.1 by introducing the principal-agent model
and the principal’s optimization problem. Section 4.2 reformulates the principal’s
optimization problem as the choice over a subset of implementable tariffs, which leads
to a straightforward existence proof, presented in Section 4.3. Finally, we discuss the
question of whether the optimal tariff will implement a utility profile satisfying the
agent’s participation constraint with equality for some type. Section 4.4 provides a
sufficient condition for the participation constraint to be binding in this sense.
Carlier (2001), Carlier (2002), Jullien (2000), and Kahn (1993) have existence
results for special cases of the principal-agent model with quasilinear utility. As
Kadan, Reny, and Swinkels (2011) explain, the challenge in establishing a general
existence result is to find a topology in which the set of objects to be implemented is
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compact and the principal’s payoff is continuous. The taxation principle allows us to
think of the principal as choosing a tariff, but allowing the principal to choose from
the set of all tariffs leads to a stubborn tension between continuity and compactness.
Balder (1996), Kadan, Reny, and Swinkels (2011), and Page (1991, 1992, 1997)
respond to this difficulty by essentially expanding the set of objects from which the
principal can choose. Balder (1996) and Page (1991, 1992, 1997) allow the principal to
choose tariff correspondences rather than functions, while also imposing compactness
assumptions on their (quite general) models that we avoid.16 Kadan, Reny, and
Swinkels (2011) expand the principal’s choices to include random mechanisms.17
In contrast, our response is to restrict rather than expand the principal’s set of
alternatives. We use our strengthening of the taxation principle (Corollary 3) to
formulate the principal’s problem as the nonlinear pricing problem of choosing an
implementable tariff subject to the agent’s participation constraint. We then show
that the principal’s choice can be restricted to a bounded subset of these tariffs—
intuitively, the agents’ participation constraint implies that the principal cannot set
the tariff too high, while tariffs that are too low raise too little revenue. We then
use the equicontinuity of bounded sets of implementable profiles (Corollary 5) to
obtain compactness, opening the door to obtain the existence of optimal tariffs from
a straightforward application of Weierstrass’ extreme value theorem.

4.1

The Principal-Agent Model

Throughout the following we impose Assumption 1, interpreting φ(x, y, v) as the
utility of an agent of type x, who takes decision y and provides transfer v to
the principal. The corresponding utility of the principal is given by the function
π : X × Y × R → R, satisfying a regularity condition analogous to the one for the
agent’s utility function.
Assumption 2. The function π is continuous, strictly increasing in its third argument, and satisfies π(x, y, R) = R for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y .
Let u ∈ B(X) be a profile of reservation utilities for the agents and let µ be a Borel
probability measure on X, describing the principal’s belief over the agent’s type.
Using the strengthening of the taxation principle in Corollary 3 we may view the
principal as choosing a tariff v ∈ I(Y ) and a pair (u, y) ∈ I(X) × Y X implemented
by v subject to the agent’s participation constraint, that is, u ≥ u. Given any such
16
Applying their assumptions to our model would restrict the possible values of the third argument
of φ and ψ to be drawn from a compact set.
17
We have followed much of the literature in assuming that the principal must offer deterministic
contracts. As Strausz (2006) shows, this is restrictive. Like us, Kadan, Reny, and Swinkels (2011)
do not require the third arguments of φ and ψ to be drawn from a compact set. In their setting this
gives rise to formidable difficulties that do not appear in our analysis because we do not consider
moral hazard.
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choice, the resulting profit of the principal when faced with type x of the agent is
π(x, y(x), v(y(x)). We thus formulate the principal’s problem as
Z
max
π(x, y(x), v(y(x)))dµ(x)
(25)
(v,u,y)∈I(Y )×I(X)×Y X

x∈X

subject to the constraints that (i) v implements (u, y), (ii) u ≥ u holds, (iii)
z : X → R, given by z(x) = π(x, y(x), v(y(x))) for all x ∈ X is Borel measurable.18
We say that (v, u, y) ∈ I(Y ) × I(X) × Y X is feasible in the principal’s problem if it
satisfies constraints (i)–(iii).

4.2

Reformulating the Principal’s Problem

Unless the argmax-correspondence Yv defined in (4) is single-valued, there are
multiple decision assignments y implemented by a given tariff v ∈ I(Y ). To deal
with this complication, we define the function π̂ : X × I(Y ) → R by
π̂(x, v) = max π(x, y, v(y)).

(26)

y∈Yv (x)

From Lemma 4.2 we have that v ∈ I(Y ) is continuous. As the generating function φ
is continuous (Assumption 1), a standard application of Berge’s maximum theorem
(Ok, 2007, p.306) ensures that for all v ∈ I(Y ) the correspondence Yv : X ⇒
Y is non-empty-valued, compact-valued, and upper hemicontinuous. Hence, the
correspondence Ŷ : X × I(Y ) ⇒ Y defined by
Ŷv (x) = argmax π(x, y, v(y))

(27)

y∈Yv (x)

is non-empty valued and the function π̂ is well-defined and Borel measurable in x
(Aliprantis and Border, 2006, Theorems 18.19 and 18.20). As every y implemented
by v satisfies π(x, y(x), v(y(x)) ≤ π̂(x, v), any selection from Ŷv satisfies this
relationship with equality, and π̂ is measurable in x it follows that we can rewrite
the principal’s problem as maximizing
Z
Π̂(v) =
π̂(x, v)dµ(x)
x∈X

over (v, u) ∈ I(Y ) × I(X) subject to (i) the constraint that v implements u and (ii)
the participation constraint u ≥ u. As every tariff v ∈ I(Y ) is continuous (Lemma
4.2) and thus implements the rent function Φv (Lemma 3), we can replace these two
18

Because X and Y are compact, v ∈ I(Y ) is bounded (Lemma 4.2), and π is continuous,
measurability of z implies its integrability, thus ensuring that the objective function in (25) is
well-defined on the feasible set of the maximization problem.
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remaining constraints by Φv ≥ u. Using Proposition 1, we have Φv ≥ u ⇐⇒ v ≤
Ψu, yielding the following reformulation of the principal’s problem
max Π̂(v) subject to v ≤ Ψu.

(28)

v∈I(Y )

We refer to (28) as the nonlinear pricing problem as it reduces the principal’s
problem to the choice of an implementable tariff attaching a price to each decision
y ∈ Y . Solving this nonlinear pricing problem yields a solution to the original
formulation of the principal’s problem. Specifically, if v is a solution to (28), then
specifying u = Φv and letting y be any selection from the correspondence Ŷv
defined in (27) provides a triple (v, u, y) solving (25) subject to the implementability,
participation, and measurability constraints defining feasibility in the principal’s
problem.

4.3

Existence Result

We now establish the existence of a solution to the nonlinear pricing problem. We do
so with the help of two lemmas which set the stage for an application of Weierstrass’
extreme value theorem. First, we observe that the objective function Π̂ : I(Y ) → R
is upper semicontinuous. The proof is in Appendix A.6.
Lemma 6. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then Π̂ is upper semicontinuous.
Second, the set of tariffs that are feasible in the nonlinear pricing problem is bounded
above by Ψu ∈ I(Y ). While there is no corresponding lower bound in the formulation
of the nonlinear pricing problem, it is intuitive that a suitable lower bound can be
imposed without impinging on the value of the principal’s maximization problem.
This is verified in the proof of the following lemma, given in Appendix A.7.
Lemma 7. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then there exists v ∈ I(Y ) such that
Π̂(v) ≥ Π̂(Ψu) implies v ≥ v.
In conjunction with Corollaries 4 and 5, Lemma 7 implies that we can restrict the
principal’s choice set to a compact subset of the set of implementable tariffs. This
yields:
Proposition 4. Let Assumptions 1–2 hold. Then the nonlinear pricing problem (28)
has a solution.
Proof. To simplify notation, let v = Ψu. By Lemma 7 there exists v ∈ I(Y ) with
the property that Π̂(v) ≥ Π̂(v) implies v ≥ v. Fix such a v. Clearly, we have v ≤ v.
Thus, the order interval [v, v] = {v ∈ B(Y )|v ≤ v ≤ v} is a non-empty, closed,
and bounded subset of B(Y ). As I(Y ) is also closed (Corollary 4), it follows that
V = [v, v] ∩ I(Y ) is a closed and bounded subset of I(Y ). By Corollary 5 this set is
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also equicontinuous. Hence, the Arzela-Ascoli theorem (Ok, 2007, p. 264) implies
that V is compact. As v is an element of V this set is also non-empty. As Π̂ is upper
semicontinuous by Lemma 6, Weierstrass’ extreme value theorem then implies that
the problem
max Π̂(v) subject to v ≤ v ≤ v
v∈I(Y )

has a solution v ∗ . As v is in the feasible set of this problem, we have Π̂(v ∗ ) ≥ Π̂(v)
and thus (using the definition of v) Π̂(v ∗ ) ≥ Π̂(v) for all v ∈ I(Y ) satisfying
v ≤ v = Ψu. Hence, v ∗ solves the nonlinear pricing problem (28).

4.4

Is the Participation Constraint Binding?

Let (v, u, y) be a solution to the principal’s problem and suppose the reservation
utility profile u ∈ B(X) is continuous. In the quasilinear case it is then straightforward that the participation constraint u ≥ u is binding in the sense that there
exists x ∈ X satisfying u(x) = u(x). For suppose the participation constraint is not
binding. Then the principal can add a small constant payment to the tariff without
interfering with the participation constraint. Because of quasilinearity, adding a
constant to the tariff leaves the optimal choices of the agent types unaffected and
thus results in a strictly higher expected payoff for the principal.
In the absence of quasilinearity, the situation is more difficult. The following
example shows that the principal’s problem may have a unique solution (v, u, y)
satisfying u(x) > u(x) for all x ∈ X, so that the participation constraint is not
binding.
Example 1. Let X = {1, 2} and Y = {1, 2}. The two possible types are equally
likely: µ(1) = µ(2) = 1/2. The reservation utility profile is given by u(1) = u(2) = 0.
The agent’s utility function is
φ(1, 1, v) = 3 − 2v
φ(1, 2, v) = 2 − v
3 1
φ(2, 1, v) =
− v
2 2
φ(2, 2, v) = 2 − v
and the principal’s utility function is
π(1, 1, v) = v + 5
π(1, 2, v) = v
π(2, 1, v) = v
π(2, 2, v) = v + 5.
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Let (v ∗ , u∗ , y ∗ ) be given by v ∗ (1) = v ∗ (2) = 1, u∗ (1) = u∗ (2) = 1, and y ∗ (1) = 1,
y ∗ (2) = 2. It is clear that (v ∗ , u∗ , y ∗ ) satisfies the feasibility constraints of the
principal’s problem, that the participation constraint is not binding, and that the
principal’s payoff is Π(v ∗ ) = 6. In the following we will argue that (v ∗ , u∗ , y ∗ ) is the
unique solution to the principal’s problem. To do so, it suffices to show that there is
no other feasible (v, u, y) satisfying Π(v) ≥ 6.
Consider, first, any feasible (v, u, y) with y 6= y ∗ . The participation constraint
implies v(1) ≤ 2 and v(2) ≤ 3, so that (because y(1) 6= 1 or y(2) 6= 2) the principal’s
payoff is bounded above by 5.
Consider, second, any feasible (v, u, y) with y = y ∗ . If we are to implement y ∗ ,
agent 1 must prefer decision 1 to decision 2, or 3 − 2v(1) ≥ 2 − v(2), which is
v(2) ≥ 2v(1) − 1.
Similarly, agent 2 must prefer decision 2 to decision 1, or 2 − v(2) ≥
is
2v(2) ≤ 1 + v(1).

(29)
3
2

− 12 v(1), which
(30)

A necessary condition for (29)–(30) is that v(1) ≤ 1 and v(2) ≤ 1. As the principal’s
utility is strictly increasing in the transfer v, it follows that v ∗ (1) = v ∗ (2) = 1 is the
unique optimal tariff.
The key feature of Example 1 is that it is simply impossible to implement the
optimal decision assignment y while satisfying the participation constraint of some
type of agent with equality. A straightforward variation on this example shows that
there may exist assignments that are implementable, but only if a participation
constraint is violated. In the following we provide a condition sufficient to exclude
these possibilities.
Let us say that an assignment y ∈ Y X is strongly implementable if for every
(x0 , r0 ) ∈ X × R there exists u ∈ B(X) satisfying u(x0 ) = r0 such that (u, y) is
implementable. Strong implementability of y is thus the requirement that y can
be implemented with any initial condition (x0 , r0 ) specifying a target utility level
u(x0 ) = r0 for type x0 ∈ X.19 It is immediate that in the quasilinear case every
implementable decision profile y is strongly implementable: whenever v implements
y, the tariff ṽ defined by ṽ(y) = v(y) + [r0 − v(y(x0 ))] for all y ∈ Y will also
implement y and satisfies the initial condition (x0 , r0 ). As we demonstrate in Section
5.3, it is also the case that all implementable decision assignments are strongly
implementable whenever the generating function φ satisfies a strict single crossing
property. Hence, the following result is applicable beyond the quasilinear case (and,
as we will see in Section 6, of relevance not only for the question we study here, but
also for the existence of stable matchings).
19
Of course, the notion of a strongly implementable x ∈ X Y can be defined in an analogous way
and results dual to the ones we give below will hold for such assignments.
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Proposition 5. Let Assumption 1 hold. For every strongly implementable y ∈ Y X
and every u ∈ CB(X) there exists u ∈ B(X) such that (u, y) is implementable,
u ≥ u holds, and there exists x ∈ X satisfying u(x) = u(x).
Establishing this result is non-trivial: While strong implementability of y guarantees that for every x ∈ X there exists u such that (u, y) is implementable and
satisfies u(x) = u(x), it is not obvious that any such u satisfies the participation
constraint u ≥ u. We tackle this issue by first exploiting the duality results from
Section 3 to show that the set of tariffs implementing a given assignment has a
lattice structure and that this structure is inherited by the set of implemented rent
functions. Appendix A.8 proves:20
Lemma 8. Let Assumption 1 hold. Suppose v1 implements (u1 , y) and that v2
implements (u2 , y). Then v1 ∧ v2 implements (u1 ∨ u2 , y) and v1 ∨ v2 implements
(u1 ∧ u2 , y).
Building on Lemma 8, the proof of Proposition 5 (provided in Appendix A.9)
constructs a sequence of tariffs implementing y such that the corresponding sequence
of implementable rent functions converges to an implementable rent function with
the property that the participation constraint is satisfied and holds with equality for
some type.
Returning to the question which motivated our consideration of strongly implementable profiles, we can now state conditions that suffice for the participation
constraint to be binding in a solution to the principal’s problem.
Corollary 6. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and suppose further that the reservation
utility profile satisfies u ∈ CB(X) and the Borel probability measure µ is strictly
positive.21 If (v, u, y) solves the principal’s problem and y is strongly implementable,
then there exists x ∈ X such that u(x) = u(x) holds.
Proof. Suppose (v, u, y) is feasible in the principal’s problem, y is strongly implementable, and u > u holds. By Proposition 5 there exists v 0 ∈ B(Y ) implementing
(y, u0 ) such that u0 ≥ u holds and there exists x̂ ∈ X satisfying u0 (x̂) = u(x̂). Let
ṽ = v ∨ v 0 and ũ = u ∧ u0 . By Lemma 8, ṽ implements (y, ũ). Because u and u0
20

The last part of this result, namely that the lattice structure is inherited by the set of implemented
rent functions, can also be obtained as an implication of a more general result (Davey and Priestley,
2002, Proposition 7.31): because the implementation maps are a Galois connection (Proposition 1)
the implementation maps reverse all existing (and not only pairwise) meets and joins. We note that
(in conjunction with Proposition 2) this general result implies that the sets of implementable profiles
I(X) and I(Y ) are conditionally complete sublattices of B(X) and B(Y ).
21
As suggested by the discussion at the beginning of this subsection, in the quasilinear case the
assumption that µ is strictly positive is not required because in this case the set S appearing in
the following proof is equal to X and the assumption is only required to ensure that S has strictly
positive measure.
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both satisfy the participation constraint, so does ũ. Further, we have u ≥ ũ with
strict inequality holding on a non-empty open set S ⊂ X (because strict inequality
holds at x̂ ∈ X and both u and ũ are continuous by Lemma 4.2.). As φ is strictly
increasing in its third argument and both u and ũ implement y we can not only
infer (from the order reversal property in Corollary 1.2) the inequality ṽ ≥ v, but
also that ṽ(y(x)) > v(y(x)) holds for all x ∈ S. Using Assumption 2 this implies
π(x, y(x), ṽ(y(x))) ≥ π(x, y(x), v(y(x))) for all x ∈ X with strict inequality holding
for x ∈ S. Now let ỹ be any selection from the argmax-correspondence Ŷv of the problem defining π̂(x, ṽ) (cf. (27)). We then have that (ṽ, ỹ, ũ) is feasible in the principal’s
problem. Further, by definition of ỹ we have π(x, ỹ(x), ṽ(ỹ(x))) ≥ π(x, y(x), ṽ(y(x)))
and thus π(x, ỹ(x), ṽ(ỹ(x))) ≥ π(x, y(x), v(y(x))) for all x ∈ X with strict inequality
holding for x ∈ S. Using strict positivity of µ this implies Π̂(ṽ) > Π̂(v). Hence,
(v, u, y) satisfying u > u cannot be a solution to the principal’s problem.

5

Implementable Assignments

This section examines the set of implementable assignments. We present our analysis
in terms of implementing an assignment y and use the terminology from the principalagent model, but of course a dual argument establishes the corresponding results for
assignments x.
As we have explained in the Section 4.4, in the quasilinear case one need not
worry about initial conditions (specifying a utility level for some type of the agent)
when considering the implementability of an assignment: one can first ask whether
any tariff implements a given decision assignment, and then can add or subtract a
constant from this tariff to adjust initial conditions at will while still implementing
the desired assignment. Without quasilinearity, adding a constant to a tariff in
general changes the assignment implemented by the tariff. Initial conditions and
implementability must then be considered together. In particular, as illustrated by
Example 1 in Section 4.4, a decision assignment may be implementable for some
initial conditions, but may fail to be strongly implementable.
The main result of this section is that in the presence of a single-crossing condition
(Assumption 3) all increasing assignments are strongly implementable (Proposition
7). When the single-crossing condition holds strictly, this yields a complete characterization of implementable allocations. Here, as in the quasilinear case, an assignment
is either implementable for all or no initial conditions and it is implementable if
and only if it is increasing. These results obtain whenever the generating function
satisfies Assumption 1. We thus generalize a corresponding characterization result
of Guesnerie and Laffont (1994, Corollary 2.1) by dispensing with the smoothness
conditions on the generating function and the restriction to piecewise continuously
differentiable assignments maintained by these authors.
In the quasilinear case it is obvious that the arguments given in the proof of
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Proposition 1 in Rochet (1987) carry over without any smoothness assumptions to
establish that under the strict single-crossing condition an assignment is strongly
implementable if and only if it is increasing. In contrast, the arguments given for the
general case in Guesnerie and Laffont (1994) rely on the existence of the solution
to a differential equation and have no obvious counterpart when the agent’s utility
function is only required to be continuous. We thus begin the analysis in Section 5.1
by building on the results from Section 3 to develop a radically different approach to
the characterization of implementable assignments. Section 5.2 provides a sufficient
condition ensuring the implementability of a pair (y, u) with given initial condition
(Proposition 6). This result requires nothing but Assumption 1. Section 5.3 then
introduces the single-crossing condition and shows that under this condition every
increasing decision assignment satisfies the sufficient condition from Proposition 6
for every initial condition. This yields the strong implementability results under the
(strict) single-crossing condition mentioned above.

5.1

A Fixed Point Characterization

We consider a given y ∈ Y X and a given (x0 , r0 ) ∈ X × R and address the question
whether the assignment y is implementable with initial condition (x0 , r0 ), i.e., whether
there exists u ∈ B(X) and v ∈ B(Y ) such that the profile v implements the pair
(y, u) and the profile u satisfies u(x0 ) = r0 . From Lemma 4.2 and Corollary 2 we
may limit our attention to v ∈ CB(Y ).
Suppose v implements (y, u) and let y0 = y(x0 ). We then have u(x0 ) = Φv(x0 ) =
φ(x0 , y0 , v(y0 )). Hence, u will satisfy the initial condition (x0 , r0 ) if and only if
φ(x0 , y0 , v(y0 )) = r0 ,
or, equivalently,
v(y0 ) = ψ(y0 , x0 , r0 ),
where the equivalence is from (1). Hence, if we let v0 = ψ(y0 , x0 , r0 ) the requirement
that v implements y with initial condition (x0 , r0 ) is equivalent to the requirement
that v implements y and satisfies v(y0 ) = v0 . Letting CB0 (Y ) ⊂ CB(Y ) be the set
of continuous and bounded profiles v satisfying v(y0 ) = v0 , we can thus focus on the
question whether there is v ∈ CB0 (Y ) implementing y throughout the following and
we will proceed accordingly.
Define Φ̃ : CB0 (Y ) → B(X) by
Φ̃v(x) = φ(x, y(x), v(y(x))) ∀x ∈ X,

(31)

so that Φ̃v is the utility profile which results if all types x of the agent are forced
to take the decision y(x) and pay the resulting transfer v(y(x)). Now suppose that
v ∈ CB0 (Y ) implements y. Then choosing y(x) when faced with the tariff v is
optimal for all types of the agents, yielding the equality Φ̃v = Φv. Applying the
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implementation map Ψ to this equality and noting that, from Proposition 3, we may
take v to be implementable and thus satisfy v = ΨΦv (Proposition 2), we obtain
that the existence of v ∈ CB0 (Y ) satisfying the fixed point condition v = ΨΦ̃v is
necessary for y to be implementable with initial condition (x0 , r0 ). The proof of the
following lemma shows that this condition is also sufficient, yielding:
Lemma 9. Let Assumption 1 hold. Assignment y ∈ Y X is implementable with
initial condition (x0 , r0 ) if and only if there exists v ∈ CB0 (Y ) satisfying
v = ΨΦ̃v.

(32)

Proof. As the argument before the statement of the lemma has established necessity,
it remains to show that v ∈ CB0 (Y ) satisfying (32) implements y. Thus, suppose
v ∈ CB0 (Y ) satisfies (32). Because v is continuous, it suffices to show that this
implies Φ̃v = Φv as then φ(x, y(x), v(y(x))) = maxy∈Y φ(x, y, v(y)) holds for all
x ∈ X. The inequality Φ̃v ≤ Φv is immediate from the definition of the map Φ̃. To
obtain the reverse inequality, apply the cancellation property (12) from Corollary
1.3 to the profile ũ = Φ̃v to obtain Φ̃v ≥ ΦΨΦ̃v. Using (32), the right side of this
inequality is equal to Φv, so that we obtain Φ̃v ≥ Φv.
Condition (32) in the statement of Lemma 9 is similar in form to the fixed
point characterization of implementable profiles v appearing in Proposition 2.2.
Indeed, because Ψ maps onto the set of implementable profiles I(Y ), condition (32)
characterizes the set of implementable profiles v which implement the assignment y.

5.2

A Sufficient Condition

Lemma 9 directs our attention to identifying properties of the assignment y and the
initial condition (x0 , r0 ) which ensure that the mapping ΨΦ̃ has a fixed point. As a
first step in this direction, we demonstrate in Lemma 10 that a modified version of the
mapping ΨΦ̃ always has a fixed point. In a second step, we then provide a condition
which ensures that the fixed points of the modified mapping satisfy the fixed point
condition (32), thus yielding the sufficient condition for the implementability of y
with initial condition (x0 , r0 ) recorded in Proposition 6 below.
We introduce two modifications of the map ΨΦ̃. The first modification replaces
the map Φ̃ by a map Φ̂ in such a way that the image of CB0 (Y ) under the map ΨΦ̂
is bounded, while not interfering with the fixed point characterization in Lemma 9.
The second modification subtracts a constant from the output of the map ΨΦ̂ to
obtain a self-map of the set CB0 (Y ).
In the profile Φ̃v agent x0 receives utility r0 . The ability to assign agent x0 to
any decision y thus imposes a lower bound on ΨΦ̃(v)(y). Our first modification is
designed to ensure that there exist a corresponding upper bound. Fix ε > 0 and

29

define u ∈ B(X) by
u(x) = φ(x, y0 , v0 ) − ε

(33)

and then define Φ̂ : CB0 (Y ) → B(X) by setting
Φ̂v = Φ̃v ∨ u.

(34)

We can then interpret Φ̂v(x) as the maximum of the utilities agent x can secure by
either accepting to pay v(y(x)) for decision y(x) or by accepting an outside option
resulting in utility u(x) (with the ε in (33) ensuring that indifferences are broken
the right way). Provided that the inequality φ(x, y, v(y(x)) ≥ φ(x, y0 , v0 ) holds, it
follows from (33) that agent x will prefer to pay v(y(x)) for decision y(x), so that
we have Φ̂v(x) = Φ̃v(x). In particular, this equality always holds for type x0 .
For the second modification, define ρ : CB(Y ) → CB0 (Y ) by
ρv(y) = v(y) − [v(y0 ) − v0 ]

(35)

and then let T : CB0 (Y ) → CB0 (Y ) be given by
T v = ρΨΦ̂v.

(36)

The mapping T thus subtracts for all y ∈ Y the constant v̂(y0 ) − v0 from the profile
v̂ = ΨΦ̂v. (By Lemma 4, v̂ = ΨΦ̂v is an element of CB(Y ), ensuring that T does
indeed map into this set). This implies that the resulting tariff T v̂ satisfies the
condition T v̂(y0 ) = v0 and hence is an element of CB0 (Y ).
Making use of our results in Section 3 we can apply Schauder’s fixed point theorem
to show that the mapping T possesses a fixed point. Appendix A.10 proves:
Lemma 10. Let Assumption 1 hold. There exists v ∈ CB0 (Y ) satisfying
v = T v.

(37)

Given the characterization result in Lemma 9 and the existence result in Lemma 10, it
is immediate that any condition which yields the implication v = T v =⇒ v = ΨΦ̃v is
a sufficient condition for the implementability of y with initial condition (x0 , r0 ). The
following proposition provides one such condition. The usefulness of this condition
will be demonstrated in the following subsection. Appendix A.11 proves:
Proposition 6. Let Assumption 1 hold. Suppose for every v ∈ CB0 (Y ) there exists
ỹ ∈ Y such that
v(ỹ) = ΨΦ̃v(ỹ).
(38)
Then y is implementable with initial condition (x0 , r0 ).

30

Condition (38) is again a fixed point condition and at first glance may appear similar
to condition (32) in Lemma 9. The spirit is quite different, however: Rather than
requiring that there exists some tariff v which stays fixed under the mapping ΨΦ̃, the
requirement now is that for any tariff v ∈ CB0 (Y ) there exists some decision ỹ such
that the mapping ΨΦ̃ leaves the transfer v(ỹ) unchanged. The proof of Proposition
6 shows that under (38), any fixed point v of the mapping T = ρΨΦ̂ satisfies (32),
i.e., is also a fixed point of ΨΦ̃.

5.3

The Single-Crossing Condition

In the most commonly studied versions of the principal-agent model and the matching
model the sets X and Y are unidimensional and the generating function satisfies a
single crossing condition:
Assumption 3 (Single Crossing Condition). X ⊂ R, Y ⊂ R, and
φ(x1 , y2 , v2 ) ≥ φ(x1 , y1 , v1 ) ⇒ φ(x2 , y2 , v2 ) ≥ φ(x2 , y1 , v1 )

(39)

holds for all x1 < x2 ∈ X, y1 < y2 ∈ Y , and v1 , v2 ∈ R.
Note that Assumption 3 does not require X and Y to be intervals. Remark 4 below
explains how the assumption X ⊂ R and Y ⊂ R can be relaxed.
If the second inequality in (39) holds as a strict inequality, then we say that φ
satisfies the strict single crossing condition.22 In the quasilinear case the (strict)
single crossing condition is equivalent to requiring unidimensionality of X and Y and
(strict) supermodularity of the function f .
Provided that the argmax-correspondence Yv is nonempty-valued, the (strict)
single crossing condition ensures the existence of increasing selections from this
correspondence (resp. that all such selections must be increasing). Importantly for
our subsequent arguments, the single crossing condition on φ implies an analogous
single crossing condition on the inverse generating function ψ, ensuring that the
argmax-correspondence Xu possesses analogous monotonicity properties. Using
standard tools from the literature on monotone comparative statics, Appendix A.12
proves:
Lemma 11. Let Assumptions 1 and 3 hold and let v ∈ B(Y ) be lower semicontinuous.
Then there exists an increasing assignment y implemented by v. Further, if φ
satisfies the strict single crossing condition, then every assignment implemented by v
is increasing. Dually, let u ∈ B(X) be lower semicontinuous. Then there exists an
increasing assignment x implemented by u. Further, if φ satisfies the strict single
crossing condition, then every assignment implemented by u is increasing.
22

In the context of a matching model, Legros and Newman (2007a, Section 4.2) say that φ satisfies
(strict) generalized increasing differences if it satisfies a condition equivalent to the (strict) single
crossing condition.
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Equipped with the sufficient condition for the implementability of an assignment
from Proposition 6 and with Lemma 11 the proof of the following is straightforward
for the case of continuous decision assignments. The proof for the general case is
more cumbersome and hence relegated to Appendix A.13.
Proposition 7. Let Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Every increasing assignment y ∈ Y X
is strongly implementable.
Proof. Fix an increasing y ∈ Y X and an initial condition (x0 , r0 ) ∈ R2 . Let
v ∈ CB0 (Y ). It suffices to show that there exists ỹ ∈ Y such that (38) holds.
Suppose y is continuous. Then, because v and φ are continuous, so is ũ = Φ̃v.
From Lemma 11 there then exists an increasing x ∈ X Y implemented by ũ, that is
ΨΦ̃v(y) = ψ(y, x(y), ũ(x(y)))

(40)

holds for all y ∈ Y . By definition of the mapping Φ̃ we also have
ũ(x) = φ(x, y(x), v(y(x)))

(41)

for all x ∈ X. Now consider the mapping from X × Y to X × Y defined by
(x, y) → (x(y), y(x)). As X and Y are complete lattices and the functions x and y
are both increasing, Tarski’s fixed point theorem implies that this mapping has a
fixed point (x̃, ỹ) ∈ X × Y . Using (40)–(41), for such a fixed point we have:
ΨΦ̃v(ỹ) = ψ(ỹ, x̃, ũ(x̃))

(42)

ũ(x̃) = φ(x̃, ỹ, v(ỹ)).

(43)

Substituting the expression for ũ(x̃) from (43) into (42) and applying the inverse
relationship (2) we obtain ΨΦ̃v(ỹ) = v(ỹ), which is the desired result.
If y is not continuous, we have no guarantee that the profile ũ defined by
ũ(x) = φ(x, y(x), v(y(x))) is lower semicontinuous and, hence, no guarantee that ũ
implements an increasing assignment x ∈ X Y , disrupting a key step in the above
proof. Replacing ũ in the above argument by its lower semicontinuous hull (cf. the
proof of Lemma 4) fixes this difficulty. The details are spelled out in Appendix A.13.

We note two corollaries to Proposition 7. First, under the strict single-crossing condition we have a complete characterization of (strongly) implementable assignments.
Corollary 7. Let Assumptions 1 and 3 hold and suppose φ satisfies the strict singlecrossing condition. Then an assignment y ∈ Y X is implementable if and only if if is
increasing and thus implementable if and only it it is strongly implementable.
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Proof. From Proposition 7, every increasing assignment y ∈ Y X is strongly implementable (and thus implementable). From Proposition 3 and Lemma 4.2 every
implementable assignment is implemented by a continuous profile. Hence, Lemma
11 implies that every implementable assignment is increasing (and thus strongly
implementable).
Second, under the conditions in the statement of Corollary 7, every implementable
assignment is strongly implementable so that every solution to the principal’s problem
considered in Section 4 features a strongly implementable decision assignment y.
The following is then immediate from Corollary 6.23
Corollary 8. Let Assumptions 1–3 hold and suppose φ satisfies the strict single
crossing condition. If the Borel measure µ is strictly positive and the reservation
utility profile u is continuous, then the participation constraint is binding in every
solution to the principal’s problem.
Remark 4 (Multidimensional Decisions). For the case of continuous decision assignments, Proposition 7 continues to hold when the assumption Y ⊂ R is replaced
by the assumption that Y is a complete lattice and the single-crossing condition is
imposed on the inverse generating function ψ. These assumptions suffice to ensure
(by arguments analogous to the ones proving Lemma 11) that for lower semicontinuous u ∈ B(X) an increasing selection x from the argmax-correspondence Xu
exists—which, for continuous y, is the only implication of Assumption 3 used in the
proof of Proposition 7. This provides a generalization of Theorem 2 in Guesnerie
and Laffont (1994). For multidimensional Y strict single crossing is not sufficient to
imply that implementable assignments are increasing, so there is no counterpart to
Corollary 7 for this case.
Remark 5 (The Full Range Assumption). To obtain their counterpart to Corollary
7, Guesnerie and Laffont (1994, Corollary 2.1) assume that the marginal rate of
substitution between decisions and transfers eventually does not grow too rapidly
(i.e., is bounded by a linear function of v) as transfers increase (c.f. Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1991, Theorem 7.3).24 It is intuitive that some such condition is needed
23

Using differentiability and monotonicity assumptions, Hellwig (2010, Theorem 2.1) shows that
(weak) single crossing suffices to ensure that if (v, u, y) solves the principal’s problem, then there
exists (v 0 , y 0 ) with y 0 increasing such that (v 0 , u, y 0 ) also solves the principal’s problem. Applying
Proposition 7 and Corollary 6 to (v 0 , u, y 0 ) shows that the participation constraint binds in this
solution to the principal’s problem and thus (because (v, u, y) features the same utility profile) in
every solution to the principal’s problem. Hence, under Hellwig’s conditions the strict single crossing
requirement in Corollary 8 can be replaced by the single crossing condition.
24
In our notation the condition is that φ is twice continuously differentiable and that there exist
constants K0 and K1 > 0 such that
∂φ(x, y, v)/∂y
≤ K0 + K1 |v|
∂φ(x, y, v)/∂v
for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y .
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to ensure that all increasing assignments are strongly implementable: if marginal
rates of substitution increase too rapidly, there are bounds on the effective “utility
transfers” that the principal can make to high agents, and the principal may not be
able to make transfers large enough to induce separation. Technically, in Guesnerie
and Laffont (1994) the implementation problem is reduced to solving a differential
equation, and the restriction on the marginal rates of substitution is used to ensure
the existence of a solution to this equation. In our analysis the assumption that the
generating function φ has full range, which we have imposed as part of Assumption
1, plays an analogous role.25 Roth and Sotomayor (1990, p. 223) offer a discussion
of a similar full-range assumption in the context of a matching model.

6

Stable Assortative Matching

This section establishes an existence result for matching models in which buyer and
seller types are continuously distributed on intervals in the real numbers and the
generating functions describing the utility possibilities available to a matched pair
of agents satisfy the single crossing condition (39). We provide conditions under
which stable, positive-assortative matchings exist, thus filling a gap in the analysis
of Nöldeke and Samuelson (2014) by providing an existence result for the leading
case of the matching model studied in Section 4.3 of that paper.26
A stable matching differs from an implementable assignment (cf. Section 5) in
two respects. First, a stable matching must satisfy a feasibility requirement. One
may be able to assign all agents to the same decision, but one cannot assign all
buyers to the same seller. Second, the stable matching must satisfy participation
constraints on both sides of the market. Addressing feasibility is straightforward.
25

To compare these conditions in a transparent setting, let us assume that φ is additively
separable, i.e., φ(x, y, v) = f (x, y) − h(v), where f is continuously differentiable and h is continuously
differentiable and strictly increasing. Then, since X and Y are compact, the condition from
Guesnerie and Laffont (1994) (stated in footnote 24 above) reduces to the existence of K0 and
K
(h0 (v))−1 ≤
R v1 with
R tK0 + K1 |v|. If this condition is satisfied, then for v ≥ 0 we have h(v) =
0
h (τ )dτ + h(0) ≥ 0 (K0 + K1 τ )−1 dτ + h(0) ≥ (K1 )−1 ln(K0 + K1 v) + h(0), which (with a similar
0
argument for v ≤ 0) ensures that h has full range. The example of the function
 p
v≥0
pln(1 + v)
h(v) =
− ln(1 − v)
v≤0
shows that full range may be satisfied even when (h0 (v))−1 is not bounded by a linear function.
26
Previous existence results for matching models with imperfectly transferable utility and a
continuum of types provided by Legros and Newman (2007b) and Kaneko and Wooders (1996) are
not directly applicable because, in contrast to Legros and Newman (2007b), we avoid smoothness
assumptions and, in contrast to Kaneko and Wooders (1996), our definition of a stable outcome
given below insists on feasibility for all types. We also note that the powerful tools from the
optimal transportation literature (c.f. Villani, 2009) are not available to us because these rely on
quasilinearity. Section 6.1 of Nöldeke and Samuelson (2014) provides a more extensive discussion of
related existence results.
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Proposition 5 establishes that we can implement any increasing assignment, and
satisfying feasibility is then a simple matter of choosing the appropriate increasing
assignment to implement. Ensuring that we can satisfy participation constraints
on both sides of the market requires an additional commonly-invoked assumption,
requiring that matches are sufficiently productive. We then use Proposition 5 to
ensure that we can implement a matching in which participation constraints are
satisfied for buyers and bind for some particular buyer, and couple this with our
productivity assumption to ensure that seller participation constraints are satisfied
as well.

6.1

The Matching Model

As indicated in Section 2, we now interpret X as a set of buyers and Y as a set
of sellers and the generating function φ and its inverse ψ as descriptions of the
utility possibilities available to a matched pair of agents. Throughout the following,
Assumption 1 is imposed. The sets X and Y are equipped with strictly positive
Borel measures µ and ν, assumed to be non-atomic and satisfying µ(X) = ν(Y ).
A matching is a measure-preserving bijection from X to Y which we may thus
describe by a pair of assignments (x, y) ∈ X Y × Y X that are inverse to each other
(x = x(y) ⇐⇒ y = y(x) holds for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y ) and measure-preserving.27
A matching together with a pair of utility profiles (u, v) ∈ B(X) × B(Y ) is an
outcome. An outcome (x, y, u, v) is feasible if it satisfies the following equivalent
conditions:
u(x) = φ(x, y(x), v(y(x))) ∀x ∈ X

(44)

v(y) = ψ(y, x(y), u(x(y))) ∀y ∈ Y,
where the equivalence is due to the inverse relationship between x and y on the one
hand and between φ and ψ on the other hand.
A feasible outcome is individually rational it satisfies
u ≥ u and v ≥ v,

(45)

where u ∈ CB(X) and v ∈ CB(Y ) are reservation utility profiles with the interpretation that u(x) is the utility that buyer x can obtain when choosing her outside option
of staying unmatched and v(y) is the utility that seller y can obtain when choosing
the outside option of staying unmatched. We impose the standard assumption that
matches are productive in the sense that reservation utilities are feasible within any
match. The interpretation is that matches may be pro-forma in the sense that both
agents in a match could simply pursue their outside options.
27
Note that the (standard) notion of an inverse relationship between x and y employed here is
more restrictive than the one we considered when discussing the example in Section 3.5.
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Assumption 4. For all (x, y) ∈ X × Y the reservation utility profiles (u, v) satisfy
the following equivalent conditions for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y :
u(x) ≤ φ(x, y, v(y))

(46)

v(y) ≤ ψ(y, x, u(x)).
Provided that a measure preserving bijection y between X and Y exists, Assumption 4 ensures the existence of an individually rational outcome: simply assigning the reservation utility v(y) to all sellers (that is, setting v = v) and setting
u(x) = φ(x, y(x), v(y(x))) will do.
A feasible outcome is stable if it is individually rational and satisfies the equivalent
pairwise stability conditions
u(x) ≥ φ(x, y, v(y)) ∀x ∈ X and y ∈ Y

(47)

v(y) ≥ ψ(y, x, u(x)) ∀x ∈ X and y ∈ Y,
where the equivalence is due to the inverse relationship between φ and ψ. Before
proceeding we observe that combining the equalities in (44) with the inequalities
in (47) shows that an individually rational outcome (x, y, u, v) is stable if and only
if v implements (u, y) or, equivalently, u implements (v, x).28 Hence, to establish
the existence of a stable outcome it suffices to find a measure preserving bijection
y and a pair of utility profiles (u, v) such that (i) v implements (u, y) and (ii) the
individual rationality condition (45) holds.
It is clear from the literature that establishing the existence of stable outcomes
will require some additional structure. For example, we cannot find an increasing
(as must be the case if the strict single-crossing condition of Assumption 3 holds)
bijection between X = [0, 2] and Y = [0, 1] ∪ [2, 3]. Our response is to assume that
X and Y are intervals.
We explain in Remarks 6 and 7 how the assumption that the measures µ and ν
are atomless can be relaxed and how one could address the case in which there are
different measures of buyers and sellers.

6.2

Existence Result

Suppose X = [x, x] and Y = [y, y] are intervals in R and let m = µ(X) = ν(Y ) > 0.
Then the distribution functions F : X → [0, m] and G : Y → [0, m] defined by
F (x) = µ([x, x]) and G(y) = ν([y, y])
28

The equivalence between the condition that v implements (u, y) and that u implements (v, x)
may seem puzzling at first glance as, in general, a profile v implementing a given pair (u, y) does
not have to be implementable itself. What is special about the situation considered here is that y is
a bijection, ensuring the equivalence between the conditions in (44).
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are continuous (because µ and ν are non-atomic) and strictly increasing (because µ
and ν are strictly positive) satisfying F (x) = G(y) = 0 and F (x) = G(y) = m. The
assignment y ∗ ∈ Y X defined by y ∗ (x) = G−1 (F (x)) is then an increasing, measurepreserving bijection and hence, together with its inverse x∗ describes a matching.
This matching is positive assortative: higher buyers are matched with higher sellers.
Provided that the single crossing condition from Assumption 3 holds, it is also stable
in the sense that there exists utility profiles (u, v) such that (x∗ , y ∗ , u, v) is a stable
outcome of the matching model. The proof is almost immediate from our previous
results.
Proposition 8. Let Assumptions 1, 3, and 4 hold and suppose X and Y are intervals
with µ(X) = ν(Y ) > 0. A stable outcome (x, y, u, v) in which the matching is positive
assortative exists.
Proof. Let (x∗ , y ∗ ) be the positive assortative matching described before the
statement of the proposition. As y ∗ is increasing, it is strongly implementable
(Proposition 7). By Proposition 5 there exists u ∈ B(X) satisfying u ≥ u such that
(u, y ∗ ) is implementable and satisfies u(x̂) = u(x̂) for some x̂ ∈ X . Let v = Ψu.
By Corollary 3, v then implements (u, y ∗ ). It remains to verify that v satisfies the
individual rationality constraint v ≥ v of the seller. Using Assumption 4 for the final
inequality we have
v(y) = Ψu(y) ≥ ψ(y, x̂, u(x̂)) = ψ(y, x̂, u(x̂)) ≥ v(y),
finishing the proof.
Conversely, if the strict single-crossing property holds, then every stable outcome
must be positive assortative.
Remark 6 (Atoms). Proposition 8 continues to hold when the assumption that the
measures µ and ν are non-atomic is dropped. We use this assumption to obtain the
continuity of the distribution functions F and G defined on the intervals X and Y .
In case F and/or G is not continuous Hellwig (2010) shows how the type spaces X
and Y may be transformed (while preserving continuity of φ and the single crossing
condition—which are the essential properties for our purposes) in such a way that the
transformed types have continuous distribution function F 0 and G0 on some compact
intervals X 0 and Y 0 , so that Proposition 8 is applicable.
Remark 7 (Monotonicity and Unbalanced Markets). Legros and Newman (2007a)
and Legros and Newman (2007b) assume that the reservation utility profiles u and
v are identically equal to zero and that φ and ψ are increasing in their first two
arguments, so that higher types of buyers and sellers are more productive. In this
case assuming φ(x, y, 0) ≥ 0 is sufficient for Assumption 4 to hold and, further,
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Proposition 8 can be strengthened to ensure the existence of a stable outcome in
which the participation constraint holds with equality for either buyer x or seller y.
Proposition 8 then continues to hold when the measures µ(X) and ν(Y ) differ (and
the definition of a stable outcome is extended in the obvious way to allow for agents
to remain unmatched, with unmatched agents obtaining their reservation utility).
Suppose for instance that µ(X) > ν(Y ) holds. Then the construction in the proof
of Proposition 8 can be applied to the set X 0 = [x0 , x], where x0 is determined by
the condition µ(X 0 ) = ν(Y ) to obtain a stable outcome for the model in which the
types spaces are given by X 0 and Y and the condition u(x0 ) = 0 holds. The single
crossing condition and monotonicity then ensure that all buyers in the interval [x, x0 )
prefer staying unmatched and receiving their reservation utility of zero to any match
acceptable for a seller, ensuring the stability of the resulting outcome.
Remark 8 (Multiple Stable Outcomes). If (46) holds with strict inequality for all
pairs (x, y), there will be multiple stable outcomes featuring positive assortative
matching: The proof of Proposition 8 ensures that there exists such an outcome
in which u(x̂) = u(x̂) for some x̂. We can reverse the roles of the buyer and seller
in the proof of Proposition 8 to similarly ensure that there exists such an outcome
in which v(ŷ) = v(ŷ) for some ŷ. Moreover, these cannot be the same outcome. If
so, we would have (u(x̂), v(ŷ)) = (u(x̂), v(ŷ)), which from (44) contradicts strict
inequality in (46) for the pair (x̂, ŷ).
The existence of multiple stable outcomes raises the question whether something
interesting can be said about the structure of the set of stable outcomes. The standard
result in the matching literature (see Demange and Gale (1985, Section 4) or Roth
and Sotomayor (1990, Chapter 9) for the case of a matching model with imperfectly
transferable utility under consideration here, albeit with a finite number of agents) is
that – using the dual order on either B(X) or B(Y ) – the set of stable profiles (u, v)
is a complete lattice. Strengthening the conditions under which Proposition 8 holds
to include the strict single-crossing condition, this result immediately carries over
to the case under consideration here. First, it follows from Lemma 8 and the fact
that under the strict single crossing property every stable outcome exhibits the same
(positive assortative) matching that the set of stable profiles is a lattice. Second, a
lattice is complete if and only if it is compact in the interval topology (Birkhoff, 1995,
p. 250, Theorem 20). The interval topology is weaker than our norm topology, and
hence it suffices to show that the set of stable profiles is compact in B(X) × B(Y ).
Since that utility profiles in all stable profiles are implementable, closedness of the
set of stable profiles in B(X) × B(Y ) follows from an argument analogous to the
one establishing Corollary 4. Invoking the Arzela-Ascoli theorem (Ok, 2007, p.264)
and Corollary 5 it then suffices to show that the set of stable profiles is bounded
to obtain the desired conclusion. We then note that the set of profiles u that are
part of a stable outcome is bounded below by the participation constraint u and is
bounded above by Φv, with analogous bounds on the set of profiles v.
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7

Conclusion

We have introduced and studied a duality relationship that provides a characterization
of implementable profiles and assignments in adverse-selection principal-agent models
and two-sided matching models. This has allowed us to extend results previously
developed for the quasilinear case, and to clarify the logic behind these results. We
believe the techniques introduced here will find other applications.
Throughout our analysis we have eschewed smoothness assumptions, as these
ought to play no role in the kind of characterization and existence results pursued
here. However, much of the power of convex analysis stems from the inherent
smoothness properties of convex functions, and many of the more useful implications
of generalized convex analysis for the quasilinear case (e.g., the familiar integral
representation of the agent’s utility profile) require smoothness conditions. Adding
such conditions to our Assumption 1 opens the possibility to investigate questions
that go beyond those addressed in this paper. For instance, given our characterization
of implementable assignments under the single crossing condition, we believe that
(under suitable differentiability assumptions on the agents’ utility function) the typeassignment approach developed in Nöldeke and Samuelson (2007) can be extended
to the general case.

Appendix
A.1

Proof of Lemma 1

That ψ is strictly decreasing in its third argument for all (y, x) ∈ Y × X is immediate
from (1) and the corresponding property of the generating function φ stated in
Assumption 1. Because φ is defined on X × Y × R, we have ψ(y, x, R) = R for all
(y, x) ∈ Y × X. Except for a permutation of the arguments, the epigraph (hypograph)
of φ coincides with the hypograph (epigraph) of ψ. As a function into the extended
real numbers is continuous if and only if its epigraph and hypograph are closed
(Aliprantis and Border, 2006, Corollary 2.60, p. 52), it follows that the continuity of
φ is equivalent to the continuity of ψ.

A.2

Proof of Lemma 2

Let (u, y) ∈ RX × Y X be implementable. (The proof for the dual case of implementable (v, x) ∈ RY × X Y is analogous.)
Y
Fix v ∈ R implementing (u, y). Then u(x) = φ(x, y(x), v(y(x))) holds for all
x ∈ X. Because u(x) is finite for all x ∈ X and φ is strictly decreasing in its third
argument, it follows that the equation
t(x) = v(y(x)) ∀x ∈ X
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defines a real-valued function t : X → R. Because v implements (u, y) we have
(using the inverse relationship between φ and ψ for the equivalence)
u(x) = φ(x, y(x), t(x)) ⇐⇒ t(x) = ψ(y(x), x, u(x)) ∀x ∈ X

(48)

as well as the incentive compatibility conditions
u(x) = φ(x, y(x), t(x)) ≥ φ(x, y(x̃), t(x̃))

(49)

u(x̃) = φ(x̃, y(x̃), t(x̃)) ≥ φ(x̃, y(x), t(x))

(50)

for all x, x̃ ∈ X.
First, we establish the existence of u, u ∈ B(X) such that u ≥ u ≥ u holds,
showing u ∈ B(X). Fix any x̃ ∈ X. From (49) we have u(x) ≥ φ(x, y(x̃), t(x̃)) for
all x ∈ X. Hence, defining u by u(x) = φ(x, y(x̃), t(x̃)), we have u ≥ u. Further,
as φ is continuous in x, X is compact, and t(x̃) is finite, we have u ∈ B(X). Next,
to construct u ∈ B(X) satisfying u ≥ u, let t = miny∈Y ψ(y, x̃, u(x̃)). Because ψ
is continuous in y and Y is compact, we have t ∈ R. Using the inverse relationship
between φ and ψ and the strict monotonicity of the generating function in its
third argument, the equivalence in (48) and the inequality in (50) imply t(x) ≥
ψ(y(x), x̃, u(x̃)). Hence, we have
t(x) = ψ(y(x), x, u(x)) ≥ ψ(y(x), x̃, u(x̃)) ≥ t

(51)

for all x ∈ X. From the inequality t(x) ≥ t and the equality in (49) we have
u(x) ≤ φ(x, y(x), t) for all x ∈ X. Hence, defining u by setting u(x) = φ(x, y(x), t),
we have u ≥ u. Further, as φ is continuous in (x, y), X × Y is compact, and t is
finite, we have u ∈ B(X).
Second, we show there exists ṽ ∈ B(Y ) implementing (u, y). Because u ∈ B(X)
holds, there exists u, u ∈ R such that u ≥ u(x) ≥ u holds for all x ∈ X. By
compactness of X and continuity of ψ, setting v(y) = maxx∈X ψ(y, x, u) and v(y) =
minx∈X ψ(y, x, u) for all y ∈ Y then defines real-valued profiles v ∈ RY and v ∈ RY .
Further, using compactness of Y , Berge’s maximum theorem (Ok, 2007, p. 306)
implies that these profiles are continuous and thus bounded. Because v implements
(u, y), we have v(y) ≤ v(y) ≤ v(y) for all y in the range of y. It follows that the
profile ṽ defined by ṽ(y) = v(y) for y in the range of y and ṽ(y) = v(y) otherwise
satisfies ṽ ∈ B(Y ). Further, by (49) and the definition of v the profile ṽ implements
(u, y).

A.3

Proof of Lemma 3

Suppose that v ∈ B(Y ) is lower semicontinuous. Then the epigraph Ev = {(y, v) ∈
Y × R | v ≥ v(y)} of v is closed. Because v is bounded, there exist v < v ∈ R with
v ≤ v(y) ≤ v for all y ∈ Y . The set Zv = Ev ∩ [Y × {[v, v]} is then a closed subset
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of the compact set Y × [v, v] and hence is compact. The generating function φ is
continuous (Assumption 1), and so a solution to the problem
max φ(x, y, v)

(52)

(y,v)∈Zv

exists for all x ∈ X by Weierstrass’ extreme value theorem. The graph of v is
contained in Zv and (because φ is strictly decreasing in its third argument) any
solution to (52) lies on the graph of v. Hence, for all x ∈ X, we have
max φ(x, y, v) ≥ φ(x, y, v(y)) ∀y ∈ Y.
(y,v)∈Zv

This ensures that the suprema in the definition of Φv are obtained, so that v
implements u = Φv.
Using Lemma 1 to obtain the requisite properties of the inverse generating function
ψ, the argument showing that a lower semicontinuous u ∈ B(X) implements v = Ψu
is analogous.

A.4

Proof of Lemma 4

We prove the first equality in (17) and the first inclusion in (18); using Lemma 1 to
obtain the requisite properties of the inverse generating function ψ, the argument for
the other cases is dual.
Lemma 2 establishes I(X) ⊂ ΦB(Y ). Hence, it remains to show that for
v ∈ B(Y ) the profile u = Φv is implementable and continuous.
Suppose v ∈ B(Y ) is lower semicontinuous. Then the implementability of u = Φv
follows from Lemma 3. Further, defining the set Zv as in the proof of Lemma 3,
we have u(x) = max(y,v)∈Zv φ(x, y, v) for all x ∈ X. As φ is continuous and Zv is
compact, continuity of u then follows from Berge’s maximum theorem (Ok, 2007, p.
306).
If v ∈ B(Y ) is not lower semicontinuous, consider the lower semicontinuous hull
v̄ of v, i.e., the greatest element of the family of lower semicontinuous functions from
Y to the extended real numbers R̄ majorized by v. (The existence of v̄ is assured, cf.
Penot (2013, Proposition 1.21).) As v is bounded, so is v̄, i.e., we have v̄ ∈ B(Y ).
From Lemma 3 v̄ implements ū = Φv̄. From the argument in the previous paragraph
ū is continuous. It remains to show that ū = u holds. Because the epigraph of v̄ is
the closure of the epigraph of v (Penot, 2013, Proposition 1.21), we have
sup φ(x, y, v) = max φ(x, y, v)
(y,v)∈Zv̄

(y,v)∈Zv

and thus supy∈Y φ(x, y, v(y)) = maxy∈Y φ(x, y, v̄(y)) for all x ∈ X, which is the
desired result.

41

A.5

Proof of Lemma 5

[5.1] We prove the continuity of Ψ : B(X) → B(Y ). The argument for the continuity
of Φ : B(Y ) → B(X) is analogous.
Fix u ∈ B(X) and  > 0. We have to establish that there exists δ > 0 such that
kũ − uk < δ =⇒ kΨũ − Ψuk < .
Let (the following expressions are well-defined because u is bounded) z̄ =
supx∈X u(x) + 1, z = inf x∈X u(x) − 1, and Z = [z, z̄] ⊂ R. For every δ < 1
and x ∈ X, we then have
kũ − uk < δ =⇒ ũ(x) ∈ Z.
As ψ is continuous (Lemma 1), it is uniformly continuous on the compact set
X × Y × Z. Hence, there exists 0 < δ < 1 such that
kũ − uk < δ =⇒ kψ(y, x, ũ(x)) − ψ(y, x, u(x))k < 
for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . We also have
kψ(y, x, ũ(x)) − ψ(y, x, u(x))k <  for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y =⇒
k sup ψ(y, x, ũ(x)) − sup ψ(y, x, u(x))k ≤  for all y ∈ Y.
x∈X

x∈X

We thus have
kũ − uk < δ =⇒ kΨũ(y) − Ψu(y))k <  for all y ∈ Y,
proving kΨũ − Ψuk < , as desired.
[5.2] Suppose V ⊂ B(Y ) is bounded, ensuring the existence of a compact interval Z ⊂ R such that v(Y ) ⊂ Z holds for all v ∈ V. We then have Φv(x) ∈
[min(x,y,v)∈X×Y ×Z φ(x, y, v), max(x,y,v)∈X×Y ×Z φ(x, y, v)] for all x ∈ X and v ∈ V, ensuring that ΦV ⊂ B(X) is bounded. An analogous argument yields that ΨU ⊂ B(Y )
is bounded whenever U ⊂ B(X) is bounded.

A.6

Proof of Lemma 6

Fix any v ∈ I(Y ). Let (vn ) be a sequence in I(Y ) converging to v. As the sequence
(vn ) is bounded, Assumption 2 ensures we can apply Fatou’s Lemma (Shiryaev, 1996,
p. 187) to obtain
Z
lim sup Π̂(vn ) ≤
lim sup π̂(x, vn )dµ(x).
n→∞

x∈X

n→∞

Provided that the function π̂ is upper semicontinuous in v we also have
lim sup π̂(x, vn ) ≤ π̂(x, v),
n→∞
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yielding lim supn→∞ Π̂(vn ) ≤ Π̂(v), which is the upper semicontinuity of Π̂. It thus
suffices to establish the upper semicontinuity of π̂ in v.
For any x ∈ X define wx : Y × I(Y ) → R by wx (y, v) = π(x, y, v(y)) and zx : Y ×
I(Y ) → R by zx (y, v) = φ(x, y, v(y)). We then have π̂(x, v) = maxy∈Yv (x) wx (y, v)
and Yv (x) = argmaxy∈Y zx (y, v). As π and φ have been assumed to be continuous
and v is continuous by Lemma 4.2, the functions wx and zx are jointly continuous in y
and v. Using continuity of zx , Berge’s maximum theorem (Ok, 2007, p. 306) implies
that Yv (x) is upper hemicontinuous in v. As Yv (x) is also non-empty and compact
for all x ∈ X and v ∈ I(Y ), the continuity of wx then implies upper semicontinuity
of π̂ in v (Aliprantis and Border, 2006, Lemma 17.30).

A.7

Proof of Lemma 7

The first step of the proof is to show that if that if the entire tariff v(y) lies below
some bound, then the principal’s payoff falls short of Π(Ψu), ensuring that such a
tariff cannot be optimal.
Let c < Π̂(Ψu). By an argument analogous to the one proving Lemma 1, Assumption 2 ensures that the implicit equation π(x, y, ρ(x, y)) = c defines a continuous
function ρ : X × Y → R. Let ρ = min(x,y)∈X×Y ρ(x, y). For any v ∈ I(Y ) satisfying v(y) ≤ ρ for all y ∈ Y we then have π(x, y, v(y)) ≤ c < Π̂(Ψu) and thus
Π̂(v) < Π̂(ψu).
The second step of the proof shows that there exists a tariff v ∈ I(Y ) such that if
v ∈ I(Y ) fails v ≥ v, then v(y) ≤ ρ for all y ∈ Y . This establishes v as the required
lower bound on the tariffs the principal need consider. Intuitively, the idea is that
if v(ŷ) < v(ŷ) for some ŷ, then the opportunity for agents to choose ŷ imposes an
upper bound on the tariff that an implementable profile v can attach to any other
decision y, giving v(y) ≤ ρ for all y ∈ Y .
Define the function hn : X × Y × Y → R by
hn (x, y, y 0 ) = max{φ(x, y, ρ) − φ(x, y 0 , ρ − n), −1}
Then {hn }∞
,=0 is a decreasing sequence of continuous functions approaching a continuous limit (the constant function −1) on the compact set X × Y × Y , and hence (by
Dini’s theorem (Ok, 2007, p. 255)) converges uniformly to this limit. We can thus
select a value n with
φ(x, y, ρ) < φ(x, y 0 , ρ − n)
(53)
for all (x, y, y 0 ) ∈ X × Y × Y . Now let ṽ be the constant function equal to ρ − n and
let v = ΨΦ(ṽ). Then from Lemma 4.1 we have v ∈ I(Y ) and from the cancellation
property in Corollary 1.1 we have v(y) ≤ ρ − n for all y ∈ Y .
Let v ∈ I(Y ) be such that there exists ŷ with v(ŷ) < v(ŷ), and let u = Φ(v).
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Then we have
v(y) = max ψ(y, x, u(x))
x∈X

≤ max ψ(y, x, φ(x, ŷ, v(ŷ))
x∈X

≤ max ψ(y, x, φ(x, ŷ, ρ − n))
x∈X

≤ max ψ(y, x, φ(x, y, ρ))
x∈X

= ρ,
where the first equality follows from the fact that u implements v ( Proposition 3),
the subsequent inequality from the fact that ψ is decreasing in its third argument
and u(x) ≥ φ(x, ŷ, v(ŷ)), the next inequality from the fact that v(ŷ) < v(ŷ) ≤ ρ − n
and the fact that φ and ψ are decreasing in their third arguments, the next inequality
from the fact that ψ is decreasing in its third argument, and the final equality from
the inverse relationship (2). This gives the required result.

A.8

Proof of Lemma 8

Let v1 implement (u1 , y) and v2 implement (u2 , y). We show that v1 ∧v2 implements
(u1 ∨ u2 , y). An analogous argument applies to the other three cases appearing in
the statement of the lemma.
To simplify notation let
ū(x) = max{u1 (x), u2 (x)} and v(y) = min{v1 (y), v2 (y)}.
so that u1 ∨ u2 = ū and v1 ∧ v2 = v.
For all x ∈ X, we have
ū(x) = max{φ(x, y(x), v1 (y(x))), φ(x, y(x), v2 (y(x)))}
= φ(x, y(x), v(x)),
where the first equality holds because v1 implements u1 , v2 implements u2 , and
both v1 and v2 implement y. The second equality holds because φ is decreasing in
its third argument. Further, for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y , we have
ū(x) ≥ max{φ(x, y, v1 (y)), φ(x, y, v2 (y))}
= φ(x, y, v(y)),
where the inequality follows from the fact that v1 and v2 implement u1 and u2 and
the equality holds because φ is decreasing in its third argument. We thus have
ū(x) = φ(x, y(x), v(y(x))) = max φ(x, y, v(y))
y∈Y

for all x ∈ X, which is the statement that v1 ∧ v2 implements (u1 ∨ u2 , y).
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A.9

Proof of Proposition 5

Let y ∈ Y X be strongly implementable and u ∈ B(x) continuous. For x ∈ X let
Ux be the set of u ∈ B(X) satisfying u(x) = u(x) for which there exists v ∈ B(Y )
implementing (u, y). By hypothesis, the set Ux is non-empty for all x ∈ X.
In preparation for the following main argument, let Vx = ΨUx . We show that the
set V = ∪x∈X Vx is bounded below and the set U = ∪x∈X Ux is bounded above. Let
v ∈ V. Then there exists x ∈ X and u ∈ Ux implementing v, yielding
v(y) ≥ ψ(y, x, u(x)) ≥ min ψ(y, x̂, u(x̂)) for all y ∈ Y,
x̂∈X

where the minimum exists because ψ and u are continuous (the former from Lemma
1 and the latter by assumption) and X is compact. Defining vb ∈ B(Y ) by setting
vb (y) = minx∈X ψ(y, x, u(x)), we then have v ≥ vb for all v ∈ V, providing the lower
bound on V. Using (19) we have U = ΦV. Hence, we may apply the order reversal
property from Corollary 1.2 to infer that u ≤ Φvb holds for all u ∈ U, showing that
U is bounded above.
Pick an arbitrary x0 ∈ X and an implementable pair (u0 , v0 ) ∈ Ux0 ×Vx0 . Define a
sequence (xn , un , vn )∞
n=1 with (xn , un , vn ) ∈ X ×Uxn ×Vxn by the following recursion:
given (xn−1 , un−1 , vn−1 ) ∈ X × Uxn−1 × Vxn−1 let xn ∈ arg minx∈X [un−1 (x) − u(x)].
As both un−1 (x) and u(x) are continuous (the former by Lemma 4.2 and the latter
by assumption), xn is well-defined. Pick any ũn ∈ Uxn and ṽn implementing (ũn , y).
We then have (ũn , ṽn ) ∈ Uxn × Vxn . Let un = ũn ∨ un−1 and vn0 = ṽn ∧ vn−1 .
From Lemma 8 vn0 implements (un , y). Further, as (xn−1 , un−1 ) ∈ X × Uxn−1 holds,
we have un−1 (xn ) − u(xn ) ≤ 0, implying that un (xn ) = max{un−1 (xn ), ũn (xn )} =
u(xn ) holds. Consequently, we have un ∈ Uxn . Letting vn = Ψun we then have
(un , vn ) ∈ Uxn × Vxn .29
By construction, the sequence (un )∞
n=1 is an increasing sequence of continuous
functions on the compact set X. Continuity is immediate from Lemma 4.2 because
each un is implementable. The sequence is increasing because un = ũn ∨ un−1
implies un ≥ un−1 . Similarly, because each vn = Ψun is implementable and Ψ is
order reversing, the sequence (vn )∞
n=1 is a decreasing sequence of continuous functions
on the compact set Y . As U is bounded above and V is bounded below, it follows
∗ ∗
that (un , vn )∞
n=1 converges pointwise to a limit that we denote by (u , v ). We now
proceed in two steps.
First, v ∗ implements (u∗ , y). This follows from noting that for all n ≥ 1 and
(x, y) ∈ (X, Y ) we have
un (x) = φ(x, y(x), vn (y(x))) ≥ φ(x, y, vn (y)).
Taking limits for fixed (x, y) we obtain
u∗ (x) = φ(x, y(x), v ∗ (y(x))) ≥ φ(x, y, v ∗ (y))
29
The argument used to prove Lemma 8 can be extended to show that we must have vn0 = Ψun ,
so that this last step is actually superfluous.
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for all (x, y) ∈ (X, Y ) which is the statement that v ∗ implements (u∗ , y). Because
u∗ is implementable, it is continuous. It then follows from Dini’s theorem (Ok, 2007,
∗
p. 255) that the sequence (un )∞
n=1 converges to u uniformly.
Second, because X is compact, the sequence (xn )∞
n=1 has a converging subsequence,
denoted by xnk , with limit x∗ ∈ X. As (un )∞
is
a
sequence of continuous functions
n=1
converging uniformly to u∗ we have
lim unk (xnk ) = u∗ (x∗ )

(54)

lim unk −1 (xnk ) = u∗ (x∗ ).

(55)

k→∞
k→∞

As un (xn ) = u(xn ) holds for all n and u is continuous, (54) implies
u∗ (x∗ ) = u(x∗ ).

(56)

By construction of the sequence (xn )∞
n=1 we have
un−1 (x) − u(x) ≥ un−1 (xn ) − u(xn )
for all x ∈ X and n ≥ 1. Taking limits for the sequence nk we thus obtain
u∗ (x) − u(x) ≥ u∗ (x∗ ) − u(x∗ )
for all x ∈ X, where we have used the continuity of u and (55) to obtain the right
side of the inequality. Taking account of (56) this implies
u∗ (x) ≥ u(x)

(57)

for all x ∈ X. As v ∗ implements (u∗ , y), (56)–(57) imply that y can be implemented
with u ≥ u and with u(x) = u(x) for some x.

A.10

Proof of Lemma 10

The set CB0 (Y ) is a non-empty, convex subset of the normed linear space B(Y ).
Hence, by a version of Schauder’s fixed point (Granas and Dugundji, 2003, Theorem
3.2, p. 119) it suffices to show that the map T : CB0 (Y ) → CB0 (Y ) is continuous
and is a compact map, meaning that T CB0 (Y ) is contained in a compact subset of
CB0 (Y ) (Granas and Dugundji, 2003, Definition 1.1, page 112).
The mappings ρ and Φ̂ are clearly continuous and the implementation map Ψ is
also continuous (Lemma 5). Hence, T is continuous. As CB0 (Y ) is closed, it thus
suffices to show that T CB0 (Y ) is relatively compact to finish the proof.
Because relative compactness is preserved by continuous mappings and the
mapping ρ is continuous, T CB0 (Y ) is relatively compact if V = ΨΦ̂CB0 (Y ) is
relatively compact. By the Arzela-Ascoli theorem (Ok, 2007, p.264), V is relatively
compact if it is bounded and equicontinuous. From Lemma 4.1, we have V ⊂ I(Y ).
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Equicontinuity of V then follows from Corollary 5 provided that V is bounded. Hence,
it remain to establish that V is bounded.
Let v̄ = Ψu. Because Φ̂v ≥ u holds for all v ∈ CB0 (Y ) and Ψ is order reversing
(Corollary 1.2), we have v̄ ≥ ΨΦ̂v for all v ∈ CB0 (Y ). Next, define v ∈ B(Y ) by
setting v(y) = ψ(y, x0 , r0 ) for all y ∈ Y . By construction of the set CB0 (Y ), we
have Φ̃v(x0 ) = r0 for all v ∈ CB0 (Y ) and thus Φ̂v(x0 ) = r0 for all v ∈ CB0 (Y ).
Consequently, we have ΨΦ̂v(y) ≥ ψ(y, x0 , r0 ) = v(y) for all v ∈ CB0 (Y ) and thus
v̄ ≥ ΨΦ̂v ≥ v for all v ∈ CB0 (Y ),
which is the boundedness of V.

A.11

Proof of Proposition 6

By Lemma 10 there exists v ∈ CB0 (Y ) satisfying the fixed point condition v =
T v = ρΨΦ̂v. We show that v = ΨΦ̃v. It then follows from Lemma 9 that y is
implementable with initial condition (x0 , r0 ).
We proceed in two steps. First, we address the effect of the function ρ. Let
û = Φ̂v and v̂ = Ψû, so that v̂ = ΨΦ̂v. By definition of the map Φ̂ and the
conditions defining y0 and v0 we have û(x0 ) = r0 and thus
v̂(y0 ) = Ψû(y0 ) = sup ψ(y0 , x, û(x)) ≥ ψ(y0 , x0 , û(x0 )) = ψ(y0 , x0 , r0 ) = v0 ,
x∈X

implying
v̂(y0 ) ≥ v(y0 ).

(58)

Using the order reversal property (Corollary 1.2), the inequality Φ̂v ≥ Φ̃v implies
ΨΦ̂v ≤ ΨΦ̃v. Using the assumption that there exists ỹ ∈ Y satisfying (38) it follows
that there exists ỹ ∈ Y such that
v̂(ỹ) ≤ v(ỹ).

(59)

The definition of the mapping ρ implies that we have
v(y0 ) − v̂(y0 ) = v(y) − v̂(y)

(60)

for all y ∈ Y . From (58) the left side of (60) is nonpositive, whereas from (59) the
right side of (60) is nonnegative for y = ỹ. Hence, we have v(y) − v̂(y) = 0 for all
y ∈ Y , i.e., v̂ = v. This implies
v = ΨΦ̂v.
(61)
Second, applying the implementation map Φ to both sides of (61) and using the
cancellation rule from Corollary 1.1 yields the inequality Φ̂v ≥ Φv. As
Φv(x) ≥ φ(x, y(x0 ), v(y(x0 ))) = φ(x, y0 , v0 ) > φ(x, y0 , v0 ) −  = u(x)
holds for all x ∈ X, the inequality Φ̂v ≥ Φv implies Φ̂v = Φ̃v. We thus have
v = ΨΦ̃v. Hence, it follows from Lemma 9 that y is implementable with initial
condition (x0 , r0 ).
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A.12

Proof of Lemma 11

Let v ∈ B(Y ) be lower semicontinuous. By Lemma 3 this ensures that Yv is nonempty valued. Assumption 3 implies that w : X × Y → R defined by w(x, y) =
φ(x, y, v(y)) satisfies the single crossing property from Milgrom and Shannon (1994,
p. 160), that is,
w(x1 , y2 ) ≥ w(x1 , y1 ) =⇒ w(x2 , y2 ) ≥ w(x2 , y1 )

(62)

w(x1 , y2 ) > w(x1 , y1 ) =⇒ w(x2 , y2 ) > w(x2 , y1 )

(63)

holds for all x1 < x2 ∈ X and y1 < y2 ∈ Y .30 This ensures that Yv is nondecreasing
in the strong set order (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994, Theorem 4), implying the
existence of an increasing selection y from Yv (Kukushkin, 2013, Theorem 2.7) which
is then implemented by v. Similarly, if φ satisfies the strict single crossing condition,
then the second inequality in (62) is strict, implying that every selection from Yv is
increasing (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994, Theorem 4’).
To obtain the dual statement, it clearly suffices to show that the inverse generating
function ψ inherits the single crossing properties of the generating function φ. That
is, we need to show that Assumption 3 implies
ψ(y1 , x2 , u2 ) ≥ ψ(y1 , x1 , u1 ) =⇒ ψ(y2 , x2 , u2 ) ≥ ψ(y2 , x1 , u1 )

(64)

for all y1 < y2 ∈ Y , x1 < x2 ∈ X, and u1 , u2 ∈ R, with the second inequality holding
strictly if φ satisfies the strict single crossing property.
Let x1 < x2 ∈ X, y1 < y2 ∈ Y , and let u1 , u2 ∈ R be such that
ψ(y1 , x2 , u2 ) ≥ ψ(y1 , x1 , u1 )

(65)

holds. Let v2 = ψ(y2 , x1 , u1 ) and let v1 = ψ(y1 , x1 , u1 ). Using (1) we then have
φ(x1 , y2 , v2 ) = φ(x1 , y1 , v1 ). Applying (39) we obtain
φ(x2 , y2 , v2 ) ≥ φ(x2 , y1 , v1 ).

(66)

Using the definition of v1 and (65) we have ψ(y1 , x2 , u2 ) ≥ v1 . From (1) and the fact
that ψ is strictly decreasing in its third argument, this implies φ(x2 , y1 , v1 ) ≥ u2 ,
so that (66) yields φ(x2 , y2 , v2 ) ≥ u2 . Because φ is strictly decreasing in its third
argument, this implies ψ(y2 , x2 , u2 ) ≥ v2 . Using the definition of v2 we thus obtain
ψ(y2 , x2 , u2 ) ≥ ψ(y2 , x1 , u1 ), showing that (64) holds. The proof for the case in which
φ satisfies the strict single crossing property is analogous.
30

It is immediate from Assumption 3 that the first strict inequality in (63) implies that the second
inequality must hold as a weak inequality. The strict inequality follows from the continuity and
strict monotonicity of the generating function in its third argument imposed in Assumption 1.
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A.13

Completion of the Proof of Proposition 7

If y is not continuous, consider the lower semicontinuous hull ū of ũ. We have
ū(x) = lim inf xn →x ũ(xn ) for all x ∈ X (Penot, 2013, Proposition 1.21). Hence, for
all x ∈ X there exists a sequence xn converging to x which (by taking a subsequence,
if necessary) we may take to be monotonic (either increasing or decreasing), such that
ū(x) = limxn →x φ(xn , y(xn ), v(y(xn )). As y is increasing, the sequence yn = y(xn )
is a bounded monotonic sequence and thus converges to some limit, which we denote
by ŷ(x). The assignment ŷ is increasing.31
As v is continuous, vn = v(yn ) converges to v(ŷ(x)). Hence, we have ū(x) =
φ(x, ŷ(x), v(ŷ(x))) for all x ∈ X. Observing the equality Ψũ = Ψū (cf. the proof
of Lemma 4) we may now proceed exactly as in the proof for continuous y with ũ
replaced by ū: From Lemma 11, there exists an increasing x ∈ X Y implemented by
ū, that is
ΨΦ̃v(y) = ψ(y, x(y), ū(x(y)))
holds for all y ∈ Y and
ū(x) = φ(x, y(x), v(y(x)))
holds for all x ∈ X. We can again use Tarski’s fixed point theorem to infer the
existence of (x̃, ỹ) ∈ X × Y satisfying
ΨΦ̃v(ỹ) = ψ(ỹ, x̃, ū(x̃))
ū(x̃) = φ(x̃, ỹ, v(ỹ)).
Substituting the second of these equations into the first yields the desired equality
ΨΦ̃v(ỹ) = v(ỹ).
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ŷ(x ) = limx00n →x00 y(x00n ). Because x0 < x00 , there exists N sufficiently large that by x0n < x00n , and
hence y(x0n ) ≤ y(x00n ), for all n ≥ N , ensuring y(x0 ) ≤ y(x00 ).
31

00

49

Carbajal, J. C., and J. C. Ely (2013): “Mechanism Design without Revenue
Equivalence,” Journal of Economic Theory, 148(1), 104–133.
Carlier, G. (2001): “A General Existence Result for the Principal-Agent Problem
with Adverse Selection,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 35(1), 129–150.
(2002): “Nonparametric Adverse Selection Problems,” Annals of Operations
Research, 114(1-4), 71–82.
Chiappori, P., R. McCann, and L. Nesheim (2010): “Hedonic Price Equilibria,
Stable Matching, and Optimal Transport: Equivalence, Topology, and Uniqueness,”
Economic Theory, 42(2), 317–354.
Davey, B., and H. Priestley (2002): Introduction to Lattices and Order. Cambridge University Press, 2 edn.
Demange, G., and D. Gale (1985): “The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided
Matching Markets,” Econometrica, 53(4), 873–888.
Ekeland, I. (2010a): “Notes on Optimal Transportation,” Economic Theory, 42(2),
437–459.
Ekeland, I. (2010b): “Existence, Uniqueness and Efficiency of Equilibrium in
Hedonic Markets with Multidimensional Types,” Economic Theory, 42(2), 275–
315.
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